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Introduction: Preschoolers’ Search for Explanatory Information 
within Adult-Child Conversation 
Explanatory understanding allows us to see how the world works and to predict 
and make sense of events, behaviors, and outcomes in our environment.  For scholars 
who focus on person’s naïve theories, explanation is arguably central to theory-based 
conceptual knowledge (Carey, 1985; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 
1998).  Even young children theorize and explain, and they do not do this by passive 
means alone.  They actively search for causal explanations and knowledge.  Children’s 
questions and the answers they receive to them can illuminate this explanation-building 
process.  Yet surprisingly little is known about young children’s search for explanations 
and even less is known about how they respond to the information they obtain.  The 
current research examines young children’s questions and the reactions to the answers 
they receive within the context of adult-child conversation as means for exploring the 
active role that children play in successfully obtaining explanatory information. 
There are many reasons to believe that information gained through child-initiated 
conversational exchanges plays an important role in their conceptual development.  
Empirically, children’s questions are frequent and striking during the preschool years 
(Chouinard, 2007; Hickling & Wellman, 2001) at the time children are making great 
strides in assembling explanation-rich naïve theories, functional understandings, and 




children have often been described as specifically motivated to actively pursue 
explanatory information, a motivation that has been variously characterized as an innate 
“theory drive” (Gopnik, 1998), a curiosity about the world shared by both children and 
scientists (Simon, 2001), or a desire to resolve disequilibrium or discrepancies between 
past experience and present events (Piaget, 1954; Isaacs, 1930), among others.  Taken 
together these descriptions provide a strong argument for closely examining how 
explanatory motivations are manifested within children’s everyday behavior.  Hence, my 
central question: How does childhood explanation-seeking actually work?   
In the present studies, I examined the patterns of conversational exchange 
between child and adult informants to clarify how children seek out and respond to 
explanatory information.   I focus on situations where children are actively requesting 
information from an adult and I examine how they react to the adult’s answer to gain 
insight into whether and when children are preferentially seeking explanations over other 
types of responses.  My background assumption is that one of the most important sources 
of explanatory information potentially available to children is the knowledge they can 
elicit from more expert conversational partners.   
Asking Causal Questions 
 In order to test the hypothesis that children ask causal questions with the 
intention of obtaining explanatory information, we must first establish whether young 
children appreciate specifically causal information.  Early research on children’s 
cognitive development argued that children did not have a true understanding of causality 
until 7 or 8 years of age.  Support for this point of view came primary from Piaget (1930), 




Results from these studies seemed to show that young children were aware only of the 
temporal relationship between two events and were unable to differentiate cause from 
effect. 
In the past thirty years, a rich literature has emerged confirming that children have 
an understanding of causality from a much younger age than previously suggested.  
Classic research, such as that by Shultz and Mendelson (1975) and Bullock and Gelman 
(1979), demonstrated that children as young as 3 years old use covariation information 
and temporal order to reason about physical causality.  More recently, Gopnik and 
colleagues have demonstrated young children’s abilities to make causal inferences, using 
a novel toy called a blicket detector, which lights up only when certain “blicket” blocks 
are placed on it (for a recent review of this research, see Gopnik & Schulz, 2004).  This 
line of research has been extended to demonstrate infants’ abilities to make causal 
inferences (Sobel & Kirkham, 2006).   
However, this contemporary research on children’s causal reasoning abilities has 
not addressed if and how children actively seek causal information.  One fundamental 
means for doing so is via language, and specifically, causal questions.  The emergence 
and structure of children’s questions was initially studied exclusively from a linguistic 
perspective, including classic research by Klima and Bellugi (1966) and Brown (1968), 
who investigated developmental changes in the grammatical structure of children’s 
questions, and work by Tyack and Ingram (1977), Cairns and Hsu (1978), and Bloom, 
Merkin, and Wootten (1982), who investigated the order of acquisition of different forms 
of children’s questions (i.e., using what, where, and who prior to using how, why, and 




More recent research begins to examine the content of children’s conversations, 
including their questions, as evidence for their understanding of causal relations.  Hood 
and Bloom’s (1979) analysis of longitudinal samples of speech from eight children 
provided initial evidence that from as young as 2 ½ years, children spontaneously talk 
and ask about causal intentions and motivations in the course of everyday conversations.  
Most importantly, children talked about causal events in systematic ways that 
demonstrated their understanding of the relationship between causes and effects, 
providing support for the idea that young children have an early understanding of and 
interest in causal knowledge. 
Research by Callanan and colleagues further examined the content of children’s 
everyday language as way of gaining insight into their development of causal knowledge 
(Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Callanan, Perez-Granados, Barajas, & Goldberg, 1999).  
Callanan and Oakes (1992) asked mothers of 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds to keep a diary of 
their child’s requests for explanations for a period of two weeks.  Analysis of the diaries 
revealed that children as young as 3 years were asking their mothers causal “why” and 
“how come” questions about a variety of phenomena in their everyday lives.  Children 
requested explanations about mechanical, natural, and social phenomena, providing 
evidence that children’s everyday question-asking extends across several domains.  This 
first study was with Anglo mothers; the same diary methodology was replicated with 
higher- and lower-education Mexican-descent families with similar results (Callanan et 
al., 1999).   
Additional information regarding the content of children’s causal questions comes 




2007; Hickling & Wellman, 2001).   Hickling and Wellman (2001) examined transcripts 
from 4 children who were recorded between the ages of 2.5 and 5 years.  They searched 
for instances of children’s use of causal terms (such as because, how, so) within 
children’s statements and questions, and compared the target entity of the child’s 
explanation (e.g., person, animal, object) to the explanation or explanatory mode the 
child used (e.g., psychological, biological, physical).  The patterns with which children 
matched explanations to target entities provided evidence for the presence of domain-
specific frameworks of knowledge within which children were able to use multiple 
modes of explanation appropriately with both constraint and flexibility (Hickling & 
Wellman, 2001).  For instance, children described the behavior and properties of objects 
only in terms of physical causality, but when the target entities were persons, children 
appropriately used physical, biological, and psychosocial modes of causality.  In other 
words, children did not randomly pair explanatory modes to target entities, nor did they 
match one mode of explanation exclusively to one type of target entity. 
Chouinard (2007) took a different approach to examining children’s questions 
within transcripts from the CHILDES database, focusing on how children generally use 
questions to obtain information.  Chouinard (2007) used the transcripts of 4 preschool-
aged children (3 of whom overlap with those used by Hickling and Wellman, 2001), to 
examine every question voiced by these children during the language samples.  
Chouinard found that the majority of children’s questions were information-seeking (as 
opposed to attention-seeking, action-seeking, or asking for permission).  These 




included requests for many different types of information, with questions about activities 
and labels being the most common. 
Chouinard (2007) also coded whether children were requesting isolated facts or 
more complex explanatory information.  At all ages, fact-based questions were more 
frequent, but there was a general increase in the proportion of questions that requested 
explanations as the children got older.  While 1-year-olds asked no explanation-based 
questions, at age 5, an average of 30% of the children’s questions were requests for 
explanations.  Further, around age 3, each child demonstrated a relative increase in the 
proportion of explanation-based questions they asked, suggesting that this may be an age 
when children are particularly interested in causal information, a result that fits with 
Hickling and Wellman’s (2001) data in which children used more causal speech at 3 
years of age than at 2 or 4 years. 
Overall, these studies provide evidence that children are not only able to ask 
causal questions early, but that they also have the ability to ask appropriately situated 
questions across a variety of domains.  This early emerging and sophisticated skill is 
potentially a powerful tool for acquiring explanatory information.  However, are 
children’s questions actually functioning as the useful tool they have the potential to be?  
Examining adults’ responses is an important step in addressing this question. 
Adults’ Responses to Children’s Questions 
The research from Callanan and colleagues (1992, 1999) and Chouinard (2007) 
also began to examine the nature of adults’ responses to preschool children’s questions.  
Within the daily dairy methodology employed by Callanan and Oakes (1992), adults’ 




the child: mothers of 3-year-olds reported responding with a causal explanation 32% of 
the time, mothers of 4-year-olds responded with a causal explanation 61% of the time, 
and mothers of 5-year-olds responded with a causal explanation 54% of the time.  
Mechanism explanations (describing intermediate steps as a way of explaining how 
something works) were the most frequent, followed by prior cause explanations 
(mentioning a prior event or state that caused the asked-about phenomenon) and 
consequence explanations (mentioning a purpose or an event/state that will occur later in 
time than the asked-about phenomenon).  No significant age effects were found for these 
different types of explanations, suggesting that parents provide a variety of different 
explanations in response to children’s questions, regardless of the age of the child. (See 
also Callanan et al. (1999) for similar results from Mexican-descent mothers.)  Chouinard 
(2007) found related results concerning the informative nature of mothers’ responses.  
Within the longitudinal transcripts, children’s information-seeking questions (collapsed 
across fact-seeking and explanation-seeking questions) received an informative reply 
(either immediately or eventually following the child re-asking the question) between 64-
79% of the time, depending on age.   
Children’s Responses: A Key Component 
This prior work begins to show that children’s questions often function as an 
effective tool for prompting adults to provide information, and that their questions 
include causal ones that can prompt for explanatory information.  However, that research 
fails to address how children react to the adult responses they receive to their questions.  
From both a learning perspective and a conversational perspective, question-asking 




learning, these steps include: a) an initial state, b) informational input, and c) revision of 
knowledge or adjustment of the system.  Further, these three steps can be seen as 
corresponding to three steps in conversation: a) the child’s initial question (e.g., “Why is 
he wearing a red nose?”), b) the response the child receives (e.g., “People don’t usually 
wear red noses like that”), and c) the child’s reaction to this response which could range 
from either their acceptance of the information and learning from it to rejection of the 
response.  While these three steps are a simplification of the complex (and often much 
messier) processes of learning and conversation, they provide a useful framework for 
examining children’s conversation-based learning. 
Moreover, the third component of these processes seems especially important for 
two reasons.  First, the nature of children’s reactions to the answer/response they receive 
critically informs us about the nature of their initial question.  For instance, perhaps the 
function of the question from the child’s point of view is simply to engage adults, or 
merely to keep the conversation going.  In this case, any conversational response from the 
adult might be fine or perhaps a particularly long response would be especially satisfying. 
(Parents often suspect this is the child’s motive at the peak of preschool-aged why-
question asking, when it can seem that no matter what the parent says, the child 
repeatedly asks, “Why?” “Why?’ “Why?”)  However, alternatively, children might be 
genuinely seeking explanatory information.  If this is the case, then they should react 
differently when they receive an explanation versus when they receive some type of non-
explanatory response.  Information about the third step in the conversation, how children 




 Second, in order to gauge when adult answers are effective, one must know how 
the information they provide is perceived by the child who has asked the question.  To 
begin with, is the question-asking child satisfied or dissatisfied with the answer he/she 
receives?  Previous research has measured children’s preferences by directly asking them 
to evaluate different types of explanations using forced choice tasks.  But it is an open 
question as to how this process works in everyday life and particularly in everyday 
conversations initiated by the child.  In this context, it is critical to examine how children 
react to the responses they receive from their conversational partners so that we can 
gauge how the question-asking actually influences the asker. 
As arguably crucial as this third component appears to be, we know very little 
about it.  Chouinard (2007) provides an initial glimpse by examining instances when the 
four children she analyzed persisted in repeating the same question multiple times in a 
row.  She found that this behavior was much more frequent following non-informative 
adult responses than following informative ones.  This provides preliminary support for 
the idea that children are often asking questions (largely factual questions in her data) 
with the goal of obtaining information, rather than just repeating a question to get 
attention or for their own enjoyment.   
In the present research, I focus on children’s causal questions and requests for 
explanatory information and I look much more fully at children’s reactions to the answers 
they receive.  In Study 1, I do so using longitudinal transcripts of everyday conversation.  
In Study 2, I create a methodology for bringing this process into the lab to better 
examine, with more effective control, the relationship between children’s questions, the 




focus from examining children’s reactions to explanations versus non-explanations, to 
examining adults’ (in Study 3) and children’s (in Study 4) satisfaction with explanations 







Study 1: CHILDES Study Examining Adult-Child Conversation Following 
Children’s Why and How Questions 
Study 1 examined adult-child conversations following preschoolers’ causal why 
and how questions from longitudinal transcripts recorded in naturalistic situations within 
the CHILDES database.  While prior studies have examined the content of children’s 
questions (causal and non-causal) using the CHILDES database (Chouinard, 2007; 
Hickling & Wellman, 2001), I use a larger sample and additionally focus on children’s 
reactions to the answers they receive to their causal questions.   
I concentrated on how and why questions (although children may have also asked 
causal questions that did not use why or how) for several reasons: from an early age, these 
questions account for many of young children’s causal interrogatives (Hood & Bloom, 
1979); consequently previous studies have also focused on these types of child questions 
(Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Hood & Bloom, 1979); and how and why questions are easy to 
search for and easy to identify as causal.  As outlined previously, I examined three steps 
of conversation: the initial causal why or how question asked by the child, the adult’s 
response, and the child’s reaction to the adult’s response.  However, my focus concerns 
the child’s reaction to the adult’s response, where I test several focal hypotheses. 
My primary hypotheses concern how different types of adult responses affect 
whether a child continues or discontinues that conversational exchange.  If children are 




differently depending on whether or not they have received a causal explanation from 
their adult conversational partner.  Specifically, if children are seeking explanations, they 
should be satisfied when adults give explanations and not satisfied when adults give other 
types of non-explanatory responses.  If this is the case, I expect that children would be 
more likely to re-ask their questions (showing continued curiosity) or provide their own 
explanation (showing dissatisfaction with information provided) upon not receiving an 
explanation.  Conversely, if children have been given an explanation, I expect that they 
will be more likely to agree (showing explanatory satisfaction) or to ask an additional 
question that is different from the original question, but building on the same topic 
(showing satisfaction and continued interest in the explanation).   
 Two alternative hypotheses deserve consideration.  First, children may ask 
questions simply to try to extend the conversation, in which case any adult response 
would be satisfying and children should show a similar pattern of responses following 
both explanations and non-explanatory adult responses.  Second, children may be 
responding based on the length of the adult response rather than the explanatory content.  
If children are motivated to elicit simply as much speech as possible from their adult 
conversational partners, they should find a longer answer more satisfying than a shorter 
answer.  In this case, children’s responses should vary based on the length of the adult 
response; children should be motivated to ask additional questions when adult responses 
are short in length and be less likely to ask additional questions when adult responses are 
long. 
I also examined the pattern of child responses in relation to the form of the 




or interesting than another, then they may be more likely to ask a follow-up question 
explicitly for that type of explanation, continuing conversation on the topic.  Here I 
explored whether mechanism explanations, which have the potential to provide rich 
information about the process underlying a causal relationship (e.g., “The puzzle made 
noise because there’s a little speaker that turns on when you fit the piece into the right 
spot”), would generate more follow-up questions than a single event mentioned in a prior 
causal event explanation (e.g., “The puzzle made noise because you put the piece in”).  
Au and Romo’s (1999) research suggests the possibility that children may find the 
mechanism explanations particularly satisfying.  
Method 
Participants 
The initial data encompassed all conversations including child causal how and 
why questions from longitudinal transcripts of six children from the CHILDES database 
(MacWhinney & Snow, 1985, 1990).  The CHILDES database consists of samples of 
children’s conversations with parents, siblings, and occasional visitors during everyday 
activities in the home setting.  The samples were recorded every 1-3 weeks for periods 
ranging from 30 minutes to two hours.  The six children included were Adam, Sarah, 
Abe, Naomi, Mark, and Ross (Brown, 1973; Kuczaj, 1976; Sachs, 1983; MacWhinney, 
1995).  The age range for the transcripts initially began at ages 2 years, 3 or 4 months and 
continued through ages 5 years, 1 or 2 months for four of the children.  Because Mark 
and Ross are siblings, their transcripts cover a wider age range, from 2 years, 6 months 
through 8 years for Ross and from 7 months to 5 years, 6 months for Mark.   




transcripts within the ages of 2 through 4 years, and the transcripts were recorded in 
naturalistic settings rather than structured tasks (e.g., a researcher-prompted story book 
reading).  While few, these 6 children do vary on gender (4 boys and 2 girls), ethnicity (5 
Caucasian, 1 African American), and family occupational status (4 children from 
academic families, 1 child from a non-academic, middle class family, and 1 child from a 
working class family).  
Procedure 
582 longitudinal transcripts (210 transcripts for Abe, 55 for Adam, 137 for Sarah, 
93 for Naomi, and 87 for Ross/Mark) were searched for all utterances containing the 
target words how and why.  All utterances containing how and why that were voiced by 
adults or voiced in statements were removed.   In addition, all questions that were 
incomplete or included unintelligible portions were set aside.  The remaining child 
questions were then reviewed to eliminate clear-cut instances where how and why were 
not being used causally.  This led to the elimination of questions such as “How are you?” 
“How does that feel?” “How about that?” and “How much milk?”  In addition, I also 
eliminated any questions voiced by children when they were younger or older than the 
age range of 2 years through 4 years because data outside of this range was limited to 
only a few of the children.  The final sample consisted of 3,162 children’s causal why and 
how questions (948 questions for Abe, 1,202 for Adam, 358 for Sarah, 68 for Naomi, 142 
for Mark, and 444 for Ross).   
Coding  
The coding scheme encompassed three steps of conversation:  the initial causal 




the adult’s response.  All coding was conducted by examining the conversational 
sequence within the full transcript.  This allowed the coders to read as much of the 
previous conversation as needed to gain an understanding of the context and meaning of 
each conversation.   
Child questions.  The child’s question was coded as “why” or “how” and either 
simple (consisting of only one or two words, such as “Why?” or “How come?”) or 
complex (including a reference to the subject of the how or why question, such as “Why 
not my cracker talk?”).   
Adult responses.  The adult responses were initially coded into one of ten 
categories including:  providing an explanation, providing on-topic non-explanatory 
information, redefining or correcting assumptions underlying the child’s question, 
confirming/agreeing with the child’s question, asking a clarification question, redirecting 
the question to someone else, saying “I don’t know,” saying simply “Because” or 
“Because I said so” without further explanation, changing the topic, or not responding.  
The purpose for these extensive initial categories was to provide a comprehensive list of 
all possible adult responses in order to help coders distinguish between explanations and 
other types of responses that might include on-topic information, but were not 
explanatory.  The analyses, however, focus exclusively on the key contrast between 
adults’ provision of explanations (e.g., CHILD: “Why you put yogurt in there?” ADULT: 
“Yogurt’s part of the ingredients”) versus adults’ non-explanatory answers (e.g., CHILD: 
“Why does he push this?” ADULT: “He’s just pushing it”).  For these analyses, the non-




mentioned above.  Appendix A provides additional examples of explanations and non-
explanatory answers from the data.   
If the adult’s response was an explanation, the form of the explanation was coded 
into one of five categories: mechanism (e.g., “It doesn’t fall off because it’s stuck through 
the paper”), prior causal event (e.g., “I think he heard a big noise”), consequence (e.g., 
“So his feet won’t get cold”), current state of world (e.g., “Because those are pretty 
colors”), or other (e.g., “You just don’t do it that way”); see Appendix A for complete 
descriptions and examples.  These categories were based on those used by Callanan and 
Oakes (1992) with revisions. One revision was adding the category, current state of the 
world to deal with frequently encountered explanations that did not explicitly refer to an 
event occurring in the past or a future consequence, but instead focused on the state or 
quality of a current situation. (However, if a current state of the world explanation 
included description of a mechanism, it was coded as mechanism explanation.) 
Child reactions.  The child’s response was coded into one of eight categories, 
including: a) agrees with adult response, b) asks a follow-up question, c) re-asks original 
question, d) provides own explanation, e) disagrees with adult response, f) provides 
additional on-topic details, g) changes topic, and h) no response.  To give a hypothetical 
example, if the child’s initial question was “Why did he laugh?” an adult might respond 
“He thought of a funny joke” to which the child might react in several different ways.  
For example, the child might say, “Oh, I think so, too” which would be coded as agreeing 
with the adult response.  Or perhaps the child might ask “But what made him laugh?” 
which would be coded as re-asking the question.  If the child asked, “Why did he think of 




think someone tickled him,” this response would be coded as providing his/her own 
explanation.  See Appendix A for more detail on these coding categories and examples 
from the data.   
Reliability 
Inter-rater reliability was established using randomly selected samples of 20% of 
each child’s total causal questions.  Two persons independently coded each of these 20% 
samples and if a satisfactory level of agreement was not achieved, disagreements were 
discussed and an additional 20% sample was selected for reliability coding.  For child 
questions, which were coded as simple or complex, there was 99% agreement overall 
(across all 6 children) and a Kappa of .99.  Coding for adult responses, as explanations or 
non-explanatory answers, had an overall (across all 6 children) 95% agreement, with a 
Kappa of .90.  For coding the explanation form of adults’ explanatory responses (e.g., 
mechanism vs. prior cause, etc.), there was 77% agreement, with a Kappa of .68.  
Focally, for all the child reaction codes there was 85% agreement, with an overall Kappa 
of .82.  Reliability was also calculated for each child response coding category; percent 
agreement ranged from 93% to 99%, with Kappas ranging from .64 to .97.  Reliability 
was also confirmed for each individual child, with Kappas ranging from .75 to .91.  All of 
the Kappas fall within “substantial” (.61 to .80) levels of inter-rater reliability and 50% of 
them fall within “near perfect” (.81 and above) levels (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Results 
The small number of children in this study presents several analysis challenges.  
In order to increase the reliability of the statistical tests used, data were pooled across 




to the independence of such data, Bakeman and Gottman (1997) suggest that successive 
events (e.g., multiple utterances from the same child) measured in naturalistic settings 
may be regarded as independent for the purposes of statistical analysis as long as (a) 
observers make separate (and presumably independent) decisions when coding each 
event, and (b) the coding system consists of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
categories.  Both of these stipulations apply to this coding.   
In an effort to avoid reporting findings that are driven by the results of only one 
child, the inferential statistical analyses followed several steps.  Initially, I used an 
omnibus chi-square to test for differences between all the patterns of child reactions to 
adult responses.  Whenever this chi-square was significant, it was followed up by 
examining proportions of responses to individual categories.  Here I used z-scores to 
assess the significance of differences between paired proportions.  The z-scores compared 
the relative proportions of coding categories to each other and across time.  For example, 
for my primary hypotheses, proportions were created by dividing the frequency of each 
type of child reaction following an explanation by the number of explanations that 
children received.  The same was done for child reactions following non-explanations, 
with the denominator being the number of non-explanations received. 
For all the analyses, I adopted a conservative level of significance (p < .01, two 
tailed), to reduce the possibility of Type 1 error resulting from multiple comparisons and 
because of the large numbers of utterances contributing to the proportions.  In addition, to 
be considered as significant, the comparison had to be in the same direction for at least 5 
of the 6 children individually.  For examples of studies that use z-test analyses in this 




Children’s Questions and Adult Responses 
 Overall, the 6 children in the sample asked simple questions (consisting of only 
one or two words) 31.2% of the time, and complex questions (including a reference to the 
subject of the how or why question) 68.8% time.  The relative percentage of complex 
questions significantly increased over time, with 53.6% of 2-year-olds’ questions being 
complex, increasing to 69.3% at age 3 (z = -7.11, p < .001) and to 79.2% at age 4 (z = -
5.27, p < .001).   
 With regard to adults’ provision of different types of answers, overall, adults 
provided an explanation 36.7% of the time, with the remaining 63.3% of adult responses 
being non-explanatory.  The percentage of the time that children received an explanation 
decreased with age, with 2-year-olds receiving an explanation 40.7% of the time, 3-year-
olds receiving an explanation 38.3% of the time and 4-year-olds receiving an explanation 
30.7% of the time.  Only the decrease from age 3 to 4 was significant (z = 3.81, p < .001). 
Do Children React Differently to Explanations versus Non-Explanatory Answers? 
To test my primary hypotheses, I compared the patterns of child responses 
following an adult explanation versus no explanation.  Table 1 is arranged so that the 
child response categories where I hypothesized key contrasts are reported in the top 
section.  Namely, I predicted that children would be more likely to agree and ask follow-
up questions following explanations, whereas the responses of re-asking the original 
question and providing their own explanation were predicted to be more frequent 
following non-explanatory answers.  Child response categories where I did not have 




explanations are at the bottom of Table 1.  These categories provide additional 
information about the other ways children react to adult responses.   
The proportions in Table 1 were calculated by dividing the frequency of each type 
of response (following an explanation or a non-explanation) by the total number of 
explanations or non-explanations received.  An overall chi-square analysis across the 8 
categories in Table 1 confirmed a significant difference in the pattern of child responses 
with relation to whether or not the child received an explanation, X2 (7, N = 3162) = 
382.8, p < .001.  Agreeing and follow-up questions were more frequent following adult 
explanations versus adult non-explanation responses (11.1% vs. 6.3%, z = 4.85, p < .001, 
and 18.5% vs. 4.6%, z = 12.81, p < .001, respectively).  Conversely, in conversations 
where children did not receive an explanation (compared to those in which they did 
receive an explanation), they were more likely to re-ask the original question (24.0% vs. 
9.4%, z = -10.20, p < .001), and to provide their own explanation (10.7% vs. 1.0%, z = -
10.16, p = .001).  When examined separately, all 6 children followed the same patterns in 
these four key categories (agreeing and follow-up questions were more frequent after 
explanations, and re-asking and providing own explanations were more frequent after 
non-explanations). 
Note that these significant differences in the patterns of children’s reactions 
following explanations versus non-explanations refute the hypothesis that children are 
simply trying to extend the conversation and that any adult response they get would be a 
satisfying one.  In contrast, the presence or absence of explanatory content appears to be 




With regard to the other categories, disagreeing was relatively infrequent, but 
when it did occur it was more frequent following adult explanations versus non-
explanatory responses (3.4% vs. 1.6%, z = 3.38, p < .001, respectively).  In conversations 
where children did not receive an explanation (compared to those in which they did 
receive an explanation), they were more likely to provide additional on-topic information 
(19.9% vs. 15.3%, z = -3.21, p < .01).  Children were not significantly more likely to 
change the topic following either an explanation or a non-explanatory answer (20.7% vs. 
17.3%, z = 2.38, n.s.).  Finally, children were more likely to not respond at all following 
an explanation versus a non-explanation (20.5% vs. 15.6%, z = 3.50, p < .001).   
Are there Developmental Differences in Children’s Patterns of Reactions? 
Because these analyses collapsed across all child utterances, they raise the 
question whether these patterns of appropriate responses might be carried solely by the 
oldest children.  However, even as 2-year-olds, these children’s responses evidenced the 
same patterns following explanations and non-explanations.  Data for the instances when 
2-year-olds responded by agreeing did not reach significance, but were in the predicted 
direction, with a larger proportion of agreeing following explanations compared to non-
explanations (10.6% vs. 8.1%).  As 2-year-olds, these children more frequently asked 
follow-up questions following adult explanations compared to non-explanatory adult 
responses (20.5% vs. 2.3%, z = 7.68, p < .001).  Two-year-olds were significantly more 
likely to re-ask their original question following non-explanatory adult responses 
compared to explanatory responses (34.3% vs. 12.2%, z = -6.36, p < .001).  Two-year-




however, the nine times children did provide their own explanations at this age, they 
followed non-explanatory responses from adults.  
Besides this examination of the youngest age, I also explored age trends.  An 
overall chi-square analysis comparing the relative proportions of child responses at each 
age (2-, 3-, and 4-years-old) was significant, Χ2 (14, N = 3162) = 133.3, p < .001.  To 
examine this overall finding further, age patterns were examined on a child-by-child basis 
to determine if there were any developmental patterns upheld by at least 5 of the 6 
children for the 4 key categories (agrees, follow-up question, re-asks, or providing own 
explanation).  There was one consistent developmental pattern in the overall relative 
frequencies of child response types over time.  Providing his/her own explanation 
increased with age for 5 of the 6 children.  Pair-wise z-scores showed a significant 
increase from age 2 to age 3 (1.4% vs. 6.8%, z = -5.22, p < .001) and from age 3 to age 4 
(6.8% vs. 12.1%, z = -4.52, p < .001) in children’s frequency of providing their own 
explanations. 
Do Children Respond Differently to Different Types of Explanations? 
Child responses did not differ significantly based on the form of explanation 
(mechanism, prior causal event, consequence, current state of world, or other) voiced by 
the adult, Χ 2 (28, N = 1150) = 17.39, n.s.  Children responded to each type of explanation 
with a similar pattern of responses.    
Are Children’s Response Patterns Affected By the Length of the Adult Response? 
 Finally, I investigated the hypothesis that children’s reactions could be based on 
the length of the adult response.  In general, adult responses ranged from 1 word to 56 




not receive any adult response (n = 945) from analysis.  Length was confounded with the 
type of adult response: explanations had a longer average length (M = 7.61 words, SD = 
4.81) than non-explanatory answers (M = 4.89 words, SD = 3.72).  This was confirmed 
by a significant 2 x 2 chi-square, comparing explanations and non-explanatory answers 
with length, which was split into short (5 words or less) versus long (6 words or more), 
X2 (1, N = 2217) = 158.8, p < .001. 
To attempt to disentangle the effects of length and explanatory response, I 
compared the relative proportions of child responses following explanations and non-
explanations within the short answers (5 words or less) and then separately within the 
long answers (6 words or more).  For short adult responses, the overall chi-square was 
still significant, Χ 2 (7, N = 1146) = 158.1, p < .001, so I then conducted z-tests to 
determine if there were significant differences in the key child response categories.  
Children were not significantly more likely to agree with short explanations compared to 
short non-explanations (12.0% vs. 11.4%, z = 0.31, n.s.).  However, children were 
significantly more likely to ask a follow-up question after receiving a short explanation 
compared to a short non-explanation (18.8% vs. 3.3%, z = 8.80, p < .001).  Following 
short non-explanations, children were significantly more likely to re-ask their original 
question (18.6% vs. 12.0%, z = -2.97, p < .01) and give their own explanation (11.4% vs. 
1.3%, z = -6.33, p < .001) than they were to short explanations.  Thus, even within the 
shortest adult responses, children still recognized the difference between an explanation 
and a non-explanation, responding in meaningfully different ways to these two types of 
responses.   




comparing the pattern of child responses following long explanations and long non-
explanatory answers was significant, X2 (7, N = 1071) = 59.5, p < .001.   Z-tests for the 
four focal categories of child reaction showed two were significant and in the expected 
directions.  Specifically, children were significantly more likely to ask a follow-up 
question after receiving a long explanation compared to a long non-explanation (18.4% 
vs. 6.9%, z = 5.05, p < .001).  Conversely, following long non-explanations, children 
were significantly more likely to give their own explanation (5.8% vs. 0.8%, z = -4.88, p 
< .001) than they were to long explanations. 
Discussion 
These results confirm the prediction that children respond differently and 
appropriately to explanatory versus non-explanatory answers to their questions.  When 
asking why and how questions, young children are not merely trying to extend 
conversation with an adult, but instead appear to be actively seeking explanatory 
information.  Thus, when preschool-aged children receive an explanation to these 
questions, they appear satisfied (as evidenced by their agreement), and in some cases are 
motivated to pursue new information on the same topic (by asking a follow-up question).  
In contrast, when children do not receive an explanation, they are persistent in re-asking 
for this information or in suggesting their own explanation.  Evidence of these same 
response patterns was present even for the youngest children in the sample.  Length of 
adult response also influenced children’s reactions.  But explanatory content, and not 
simply length alone, was an important factor.  Thus, within the shortest adult responses, 
as well as within the longest ones, children still reacted differently and appropriately to 




Study 2 aims to replicate these patterns of child responses within an experimental 
format.  Beyond replication, the experimental format provides the opportunity to address 
several challenges with the naturalistic data used in Study 1, namely small sample size 







Study 2: Experimental Study of Children’s Responses Following Explanations 
versus Non-Explanatory Answers 
 The general aim for Study 2 was to examine children’s responses to explanations 
versus non-explanatory answers within an experimental context.  Although 
conversational sequences were revealing in the naturalistic data, numerous utterances 
must be available from everyday conversation to accrue enough data for analysis.  In 
Study 1 (as well as in Chouinard, 2007 and Hickling & Wellman, 2001), this resulted in 
small sample sizes.  An experimental situation can be structured to prompt children’s 
inquiries with higher frequency.  Moreover, experimental contexts allow for experimental 
control.  In particular, in the lab I could script adult responses, allowing for more 
controlled contrasts of how the child would respond to explanations versus non-
explanations.  Scripted adult responses with specified topics for conversation also 
provided the advantage of avoiding confounds of various sorts that may exist in 
naturalistic data where conversational partners have complete freedom over the topic of 
discussion.  In particular, it allowed us to disentangle length and explanation/non-
explanation in adult responses. 
Thus the specific aims for this study were to devise situations and items where 
children’s question-asking could be elicited and then to provide controlled adult 
responses to those questions.  To achieve these aims, I devised a methodology inspired by 




children were encouraged to ask questions about unfamiliar artifacts.  The procedure 
began with a short warm-up where a puppet modeled question-asking and then children 
were given opportunities to ask the researcher questions about 12 test objects.  Using this 
methodology, on average 3-and 4-year-olds asked at least one question each about 10 or 
11 of the 12 objects. 
Kemler Nelson et al. (2004) focused on object-situations where children were 
likely to ask ambiguous questions (e.g., “What is it?”).  For some children these 
ambiguous questions were answered with the object’s name and for other children they 
were answered with the object’s function.  To assess children’s satisfaction with the type 
of answer they received, Kemler Nelson et al. (2004) measured how often children 
followed up their original question with additional, often more specific/directed inquiries.  
In their research, children were more likely to ask additional questions when given a 
name for the object.  In contrast, children asked fewer additional questions when given a 
function.  The researchers interpreted this reaction as meaning that the children were 
seeking and thus were more satisfied with function information in comparison to name 
information.   
In Study 2, incorporating similar techniques, I used a series of objects, 
storybooks, pictures, and short videos to elicit children’s explanatory inquiries.  The 
stimuli depicted surprising, unusual, or expectation-violating situations that had the 
potential to provoke requests for explanations, such as a story about a girl who pours 
ketchup on her ice cream or a video of a woman turning the lights off with her foot 
instead of her hand.  Just as in Study 1, rather than being situated within a single domain 




variety of items, situations, and domains for events that might need to be explained (e.g., 
psychological motivations, physical consequences, biological phenomena).  The key 
outcomes measured for this study, as in Study 1, concerned how the children reacted 
when the adult provided an explanation versus a non-explanatory response. 
  Initially, I hoped to create situations where the adult would provide explanatory 
and non-explanatory information only after the child participant asked a causal why or 
how question.  However, in piloting testing, there were significant individual differences 
in how often children asked questions.  Moreover, often it seemed that children were 
often requesting an explanation by using statements rather than articulating a specific 
causal question (e.g., saying “Hey, she used her foot!” when encountering the video of 
the woman turning off the light switch with her foot).  Pragmatically, these statements 
operated as requests for the adult to explain what the child was noticing and commenting 
on.  I refer to these types of statements as “requestive” statements, borrowing from 
language used by linguists to describe the illocutionary force or intended function behind 
speech acts that are formally statements, yet function as requests (see Searle, 1969).  
Based on this pilot testing, in the final procedure the signal for the adult to provide the 
explanatory or non-explanatory answer was when the child verbally acknowledged the 
unusual aspect of the stimulus, including cases when the child produced a causal question 
or an appropriate requestive statement or exclamation remarking on the oddity.   
 Predictions for the outcome of this study parallel and extend those for Study 1 
regarding explanatory versus non-explanatory responses.  Using the same logic as in 
Study 1, if children are actively seeking out explanatory knowledge, one would expect to 




received an explanation.  In particular, when children do not receive an explanation, I 
predicted signs of dissatisfaction and specifically that they would be more likely to re-ask 
their original question.  When children do receive an explanation, I predicted that they 
would be more likely to show signs of satisfaction with the answer by agreeing or 
nodding their heads (a response I could now capture on videotape).  In addition, 
following explanations, I predicted children would be more likely to ask an additional 




Participants were 42 preschool children from a Midwestern university city.  The 
sample was recruited from university preschools that encourage active exploration and 
questioning.  The community from which this sample was recruited is predominantly 
Caucasian, and highly-educated.  There were 21 younger children (mean age = 3 years, 
11 months; SD = 2.76 months; 11 girls, 10 boys) ranging from 3 years, 5 months to 4 
years, 3 months of age and 21 older children (mean age = 4 years, 9 months; SD = 3.60 
months; 7 girls, 14 boys) ranging from 4 years, 4 months to 5 years, 3 months of age.  An 
additional three children were dropped from the final sample because they did not 
complete the study.   
Materials 
 Materials included 4 objects, 4 storybooks, 4 pictures, and 4 short videos designed 
to create surprising, question-provoking situations.  The objects included a box of 




not fit, a hat with a hole in it, and a clam-shell toy cell phone that would not open.  The 
storybooks described a child who poured orange juice on his cereal instead of milk, a girl 
who poured ketchup on her ice cream instead of chocolate sauce, a boy who wore a scarf 
and mittens to play outside on a warm day, and a girl who went to bed with her clothes 
and shoes on.  The pictures depicted situations with one surprising feature; a picture of a 
bird’s nest containing two baby birds and a turtle, an unusually small door, a normally 
dressed man wearing a clown nose, and a bed located outside of a house on the lawn.  
The videos presented short segments showing a person doing puzzling activities, 
including turning off a light with her foot, spinning while walking across a room, wearing 
a bucket instead of a hat, and jumping on her hat.  To ensure the child had been able to 
see everything that happened in the video, the videos were each presented three times 
back to back.  
Procedure 
 Children were tested individually in a quiet room at their school.  The interaction 
was videotaped either by a separate researcher seated in the room holding the video 
camera, or by using a video camera attached to a tripod in view of the child.   
The adult began by explaining, “I brought some toys from my house to show you 
today.  These are my toys, so if you have any questions about them, you can ask me.”  
Next, a short warm-up activity was used to briefly model the question-asking 
conversational format and engage the child.  The warm-up began with the adult 
introducing the child to a puppet named “Buggy.”  Buggy then answered two of the 
adult’s questions about a toy car with an unusual hook attached to it.  These questions 




does it have a hook on it?” 
 Participants were then presented with the objects, storybooks, pictures, and short 
videos.  Each item was presented individually and the items were presented in the same 
order for all children.  The adult presented each item with a short statement introducing 
it, without explicitly mentioning the unusual or surprising aspect of the item.  For 
example, “This is my brand new hat,” or “Can you help me put this puzzle together?”  If 
the child demonstrated recognition of the unusual aspect of the stimulus (including asking 
a causal why or how question or making a statement about the unusual aspect with a 
quizzical look or intonation), the researcher responded by providing either an explanation 
or a non-explanatory answer (alternating over trials).   
Non-explanatory answers included four different types: restatement (e.g., “You’re 
right, there is a turtle in that bird’s nest.”); normative (e.g., “People don’t usually wear 
red noses like that.”); descriptive (e.g., “That looks like vanilla ice cream.”); and personal 
reaction (e.g., “I like to put milk on my cereal.”).  See Appendix B for list of explanations 
and non-explanatory answers used with each stimulus.  These different types of non-
explanatory answers were modeled on some of the non-explanatory answers adults gave 
in Study 1.  Using different types, rather than a single format, for these non-explanations 
created useful variation in that it reduces the predictability of what the adult will say in 
response to the child’s inquiries.    
As discussed for Study 1, there are alternative possibilities for why a child might 
respond to explanations and non-explanations differently (other than the presence versus 
absence of explanatory information).  One possibility is that children might respond to 




explanation and non-explanation for each item were created to be equal in word length.  
The average word length for explanations was 9 words and the average word length for 
non-explanations was 8.5 words.  Another alternative possibility might be that children 
would respond to the presence of causal terms in the explanations that are absent from the 
non-explanations.  To address this possibility, explanations were carefully worded to 
avoid using key causal terms such as “because” and “so” for all cases, with only one 
exception.  
The adult paused to allow time for the child’s response before moving on to the 
next item.  In cases where the researcher had responded with a non-explanation and the 
child re-asked his or her original question (or continued to demonstrate curiosity about 
the unusual aspect of the item), the researcher provided the explanatory answer.   
 Children’s responses to the adult’s provision of an explanation versus a non-
explanation were coded from the videotaped interactions, using a coding system similar 
to the one used in Study 1, including the key categories:  
a) Agreeing with the adult, including nodding head or saying “oh,” 
For example: CHILD: “Why Cathy did that?” ADULT (explanation): “She 
thought it was chocolate syrup,” CHILD: “Oh, chocolate syrup.” 
b) Asking a follow-up question, 
For example: CHILD: “Why does he have his bed outside like this?” ADULT 
(explanation): “Tommy’s parents are painting his room,” CHILD: “And 
they—and do they want it to be a surprise?” 
c) Re-asking the original question, and 




“People don’t usually jump on hats,” CHILD: “Why were you doing it?”  
d) Providing own explanation. 
For example: CHILD: “But why she has the bucket on her head?” ADULT 
(non-explanation): “Well she didn’t put the hat on her head,” CHILD: 
“Because she didn’t see that hat?”  
Additional categories were also included to provide additional information about the 
range of children’s responses: e) smiles or laughs, f) disagrees with adult response, g) 
provides additional on-topic details, h) changes topic or asks for next item, and i) no 
response.  The coding categories are detailed in Appendix C.  Whether the child had used 
a statement or a question to acknowledge the unusual aspect of the stimulus was also 
coded. 
Inter-rater reliability was established using randomly selected samples of 20% of 
the participants.  Two persons independently coded the reliability sample and if a 
satisfactory level of agreement was not achieved, disagreements were discussed and an 
additional 20% sample was selected for reliability coding.  Overall across all 9 child 
response coding categories, there was 82% agreement, with a Kappa of .78.  Reliability 
was also calculated for each child response coding category; percent agreement ranged 
from 93% to 98%, with Kappas ranging from .73 to .88.  Because instances of children 
providing their own explanations were rare, reliability for this category was calculated 
using a separate 20% sample resulting in 99% agreement and a Kappa of .88.  All of the 
Kappas for coding in this study fall within substantial (.61 to .80) levels of inter-rater 






Children were each presented with all 16 stimuli in individual sessions lasting 15-
25 minutes.  Children asked an average of 4.6 questions total and made requestive 
statements about the unusual aspect of the stimulus an average of 7.7 times for a total of 
12.3 “requests” for explanation.  The adult researcher provided the child with an average 
of 6.1 explanations and 6.2 non-explanations in response to the child’s requests about the 
unusual stimuli, in essence providing explanations and non-explanations each about 50% 
of the time. 
Do Children Respond Differently to Explanations versus Non-Explanatory Answers? 
As in Study 1, if the purpose of children’s causal questions is to actively seek out 
theory-building knowledge, one would expect to find variation in the pattern of children’s 
responses based on whether or not they have received a causal explanation.  Indeed, this 
variation was present as shown in Table 2, where again the more focal response 
categories (where I predicted key contrasts) are reported in the top section.  Specifically, 
as in Study 1, I predicted that children would be more likely to agree and ask follow-up 
questions following explanations, whereas re-asking the original question and providing 
their own explanation were predicted to be more frequent following non-explanatory 
answers.  Child response categories for which I did not have predictions or that I did not 
expect to differ significantly between explanation and non-explanations are in the lower 
portion of Table 2.  These categories provide additional information about the ways in 
which children react to adult responses.   
 For the analyses, I calculated proportions for each child by dividing the frequency 




that child received.  The same was done for child reactions following non-explanations, 
with the denominator being the number of non-explanations received by the child.  An 
overall ANOVA indicated a significant difference in the patterns of child responses 
following explanations versus following non-explanations, F (8, 320) = 11.95, p < .01.  
Confirming the same patterns shown in Study 1, Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons 
showed that children were significantly more likely to agree, p < .001, or ask a follow-up 
question, p < .001, in response to explanations than to non-explanatory answers.  
Conversely, children were significantly more likely to respond by re-asking their 
question, p < .001, or by providing their own explanation, p < .05, following non-
explanations compared to explanations.   
These patterns in children’s responses were consistent across a majority of 
children in the sample.  Of the 35 children who responded at least once by agreeing or 
nodding their heads, 29 did so more often following an explanation than following a non-
explanation, p < .001, binomial test.  For follow-up questions, of the 24 children who 
asked at least one of these questions, 21 children did this more often in response to an 
explanation than in response to a non-explanation, p < .001, binomial test.  All 20 of the 
children who responded at least once by re-asking their original question did so more 
often when they received a non-explanation as opposed to an explanation, p < .001, 
binomial test.  Finally, 8 out of the 9 children who provided their own explanation at least 
once used this response more often following non-explanations than explanations, p < 
.05, binomial test. 
With regard to the further coding categories, the videotaped data revealed that 




an explanation than in response to a non-explanation, p < .01.  In both studies explicit 
disagreement with the adults’ responses was very rare, but in this study, children were 
significantly more likely to disagree with non-explanations, p < .01, whereas in Study 1 
this response was significantly more likely to follow an explanation.  Finally, although 
the means are in the same direction in both studies, in this study, when children 
responded by providing additional on-topic supporting details or by changing the 
topic/asking for the next item or by giving no response, they were not significantly more 
likely to do these types of responses following either explanations or non-explanations.  
Whereas in Study 1, providing additional details was significantly more likely to follow a 
non-explanation, while giving no response was significantly more likely to follow an 
explanation. 
I also compared the patterns of children’s reactions following the four different 
types of non-explanatory answers (restatement, normative, descriptive and personal 
reaction) to confirm that they all functioned in the same way.  Children’s responses did 
not differ significantly based on the type of non-explanatory answer voiced by the adult, 
F (24, 528) = 1.39, n.s.  Children responded to each type of non-explanation with a 
similar pattern of responses.    
Children’s Use of Questions versus Statements to Request Explanations 
To confirm that children’s use of requestive statements to conversationally point 
out the unusual aspect of the stimulus functioned as requests for explanations in the same 
way as did their questions, analyses were conducted to compare children’s response 




For the instances in which children acknowledged the unusual characteristic with 
a question, the same patterns of child reactions following explanations versus non-
explanations shown in the full sample were also demonstrated in this subset.  As 
expected, when children asked a question initially they were more likely to agree/nod 
their heads, t (41) = 2.58, p < .05, and ask a follow-up question, t (41) = 3.80, p < .001, 
when they received an explanation than when they received a non-explanation.  When 
children received a non-explanation in response to their question, they were more likely 
to re-ask their question, t (41) = -4.32, p < .01, or disagree, t (41) = -2.41, p < .05, in 
contrast to when they received an explanation.  Children were not significantly more 
likely to provide their own explanation following a non-explanatory adult response 
versus an explanatory response. 
Importantly, when children acknowledged the unusual aspect of the stimulus with 
a statement, they were also more likely to agree/nod their heads, t (41) = 3.19, p < .01, 
and ask a follow-up question, t (41) = 2.95, p < .01, in response to explanations compared 
to non-explanations.  Also, (as with the instances when children voiced a question) when 
they used a statement to prompt an adult response they were also more likely to re-ask 
their question, t (41) = -3.50, p < .01, following a non-explanation than following an 
explanation.  Although not significant, there was a trend for children to provide their own 
explanation more frequently following non-explanations compared to explanations, t (41) 
= -1.88, p < .10.   
Are there Developmental Differences in Children’s Patterns of Reactions? 
There were no significant main effects or interactions involving age.  But to 




confirmed that they demonstrated the same pattern of reactions following explanations 
versus non-explanations.  Specifically, just as in the entire data, even the youngest 
children were more likely to agree/nod their heads, t (20) = 2.43, p < .05, and ask a 
follow-up question, t (20) = 2.24, p < .05, in response to explanation than in response to a 
non-explanation.  Children in the younger age group were also more likely to re-ask their 
original question following a non-explanation than following an explanation, t (20) = -
3.61, p < .01.  Although the younger children did not demonstrate significant differences 
in voicing their own explanations following explanations versus non explanations, this 
response did show a trend in the same direction as the general sample (with their own 
explanations more likely to follow non-explanations, t (20) = -1.86, p < .10). 
Discussion 
These results further demonstrate that when asking causal questions (or using 
statements that point out a surprising feature) with adult conversational partners, young 
children are more satisfied with adult responses that provided a causal explanation 
compared to those that do not.  In the cases when they do not get an explanation, even the 
youngest children continue to seek this causal information by re-asking their question.  
Additionally, in both this study and Study 1, children are significantly more likely to ask 
a follow-up question to their original inquiry when it was answered with an explanation 
than when it was not.  This suggests that causal explanations may foster continued 
conversation and knowledge seeking. 
Study 2 also yielded a promising experimental method, useable in further 
research, with several specific advantages.  First, this methodology provides a means for 




transcript.  Second, scripting adult responses allowed for control over possible 
confounding factors such as length and the presence of causal vocabulary (words like 
“because” and “so”).  My control of these factors means that the results from Study 2 
cannot be due to length or the mere presence of causal words in adult responses.  
Children instead appear to be responding in organized, meaningful ways based on the 
presence or absence of explanatory content in the adult responses they receive. 
General Discussion for Studies 1 and 2 
 Examining conversational exchanges, with a particular focus on children’s 
reactions to the different types of information they get from adults in response their own 
requests, provides several important insights.  First, the different patterns in children’s 
reactions following explanatory versus non-explanatory information gives firm support 
for the hypothesis that young children are motivated to actively seek out causal 
information and are capable of using specific conversational strategies to obtain it.  
Second, when preschool children ask numerous “why?” questions, they are not merely 
trying to prolong conversation (as previously suspected by many parents and researchers 
alike).  Upon receiving an explanation, but not otherwise, children often end their 
questioning and react with satisfaction. 
 The conclusions in these studies are especially strong because they converge 
across both naturalistic situations and conversations (Study 1) and more controlled 
laboratory situations and conversations (Study 2).  With these comprehensive methods, I 
are not just measuring the causal knowledge children already have, but are assessing a 
socially-situated process by which they can obtain this knowledge within their everyday 




information (consider e.g., direct instruction or first-hand observation), but children’s 
requests within adult-child conversation are a frequently used and useful tool for their 
seeking out this knowledge. These child-adults exchanges prove to be similarly useful for 
investigators to specify exactly which knowledge the child wants to find out.  
(Complementing Harris and Koenig (2006)’s discussion of children learning from adult’s 
testimony.) 
 These studies raise several questions for future research.  First, there are the 
questions of what exactly constitutes a satisfying explanation for children and whether 
this changes developmentally.  The explanations voiced by adults in Study 1 and scripted 
in Study 2 are generally relatively concise, and yet they are considered satisfying by 
preschool-aged children.  Would briefer, or more detailed, explanations be similarly 
satisfying?  This is importantly related to Keil and colleagues’ arguments about the 
“shallows” of ordinary explanation (Mills & Keil, 2004; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002).  Here, 
there is the further important question of whether adults’ satisfaction with less-detailed 
versus more detailed explanations is the same as children’s satisfaction with these 
explanations.  The methodology created for Study 2 (i.e., the set of stimuli that reliably 
prompt children to voice questions and make inquiries) provides a means for potentially 
answering these questions.  Studies 3 and 4 investigate the issues raised here by 







Introduction: Adults’ and Preschool Children’s Preferences for Explanatory Detail 
In the previous two studies, I demonstrated that children react systematically 
differently based on whether they have received an explanation or not in response to their 
inquiries.  This leads to additional intriguing questions about how children evaluate this 
explanatory information: Is any explanatory information good enough?  Are some 
explanations better than others?   
Intuitively, one would expect that differences in the structure or content of 
explanations could affect their appeal, making some explanations more satisfying than 
other explanations.  For example, the factor of length was raised in Study 1; perhaps 
longer explanations are more satisfying, on average, because they contain more 
information, are more detailed, or are more specific in their content.  However, one could 
imagine other, more meaningful differences in the content of explanations that might lead 
to some types of explanations being more satisfying than others.  Although I did not find 
a difference between children’s reactions to prior cause, consequence, mechanism, or 
state of the world explanations as I defined them in Study 1, other distinctions between 
different types of explanations may have an impact on children’s (and adults’) level of 
satisfaction.  I begin by reviewing the literature addressing the issue of explanatory depth 
or detail and then provide examples from the large body of research that has studied 




examine first adults’ and then children’s satisfaction with and recall of explanations that 
differ in the amount of detail they provide. 
The Issue of Explanatory Depth 
 Does adding detail to an explanation make it more satisfying?  If so, what sort of 
details? How detailed are the explanations that adults and children possess and prefer?  
Keil and colleagues have found that both adults and children overestimate the amount of 
detail they are able to provide when asked to explain how an everyday mechanical device 
works (Mills & Keil, 2004; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002).  In these studies, adults and 
elementary-school children are asked to rate their understanding of familiar mechanical 
devices both before and after a series of manipulations which include: writing a step-by-
step explanation of how the device works, answering a diagnostic question about the 
mechanism, and reading an “expert” explanation.  Adults, fourth-graders, and second-
graders show a similar pattern of re-evaluating their previous estimations of their own 
knowledge and lowering their ratings for how much they understand about the devices.  
In other words, at first, participants rate themselves as having a fairly good explanatory 
understanding of the devices, but after exposure to the different manipulations 
participants recognize how little they actually knew.  Rozenblit and Keil (2002) dubbed 
this effect the “illusion of explanatory depth.”   
This research raises intriguing questions.  For our everyday knowledge of the 
world, how much explanatory “depth,” completeness, or detail do we seek, obtain, and 
prefer?  Do these preferences change when we are actively learning facts about a 
phenomenon or domain compared to when we are more passively gathering information 




learning about phenomena and domains?  One interpretation of the adults and children in 
Keil and colleagues’ research is that they recognize the more detailed “expert” 
explanations as being better and this causes them to lower ratings of their own knowledge 
in comparison.  In this way, they appear to indicate a preference for more detail.  But if 
so, why do people often provide only superficial explanations?  And is more detail 
always better?  Keil’s research tells us about adults’ and children’s abilities to evaluate 
explanations and the level of detail in the explanations they possess, but it does not tell us 
the amount of detail adults and children prefer or seek.  In fact, one could take the 
opposing position that the “shallow” nature of adults’ and children’s explanatory 
knowledge suggests that they may prefer less detailed explanations and do not seek to 
obtain full, deep, detailed understanding of everyday causal mechanisms, but rather less 
detailed (even “shallow”) understanding (see Keil, 1998).  This may be especially true for 
children who are developing knowledge in unfamiliar domains, as they build an abstract 
understanding before moving to a more concrete one (Simons & Keil, 1995; Wellman & 
Gelman, 1998). 
 Intuitively, detail and “depth” come in varying degrees or levels, and so people 
might prefer and seek explanations and understandings that are not “shallow,” but are 
also not complete and fully detailed.  After a point, deeper would not necessarily be 
better.  Thus, one hypothesis is that adults or children may have some sense of an optimal 
level of detail; providing additional detail beyond this point results in an explanation 
becoming less satisfying (because it is seen as unnecessary).  Within the context of 
explanation-seeking, adults’ and children’s preferences for explanatory detail remains an 




by comparing participants’ reactions to explanations with little, more, and a lot more 
detail.  However, it is also important to situate my research within a context of the 
previous work on children’s preferences for different types of explanations. 
Children’s Preferences for Different Types of Explanations 
One way to directly measure children’s preferences for one type of explanation 
over another is to give children a description of a phenomenon and then ask them to 
choose the best/most plausible explanation from a set of choices.  Past studies have used 
this forced-choice method, examining primarily two dimensions of explanations: modes 
of explanation for specific content areas and more general metacognitive criteria of 
explanations. 
There is an extensive body of research looking at children’s modes of explanation 
within specific domains including naïve psychology, naïve physics, and naïve biology.  
These types of forced-choice studies have often been done with the purpose of 
investigating the nature of children’s understandings within a particular domain.  One 
example of these studies is Hatano and Inagaki (1993).  In this study, 6-year-olds, 8-year-
olds, and adults were presented with a causal question about a biological process (e.g., 
“Why do we eat food every day?”) and then asked to pick the best explanation from three 
choices: an intentional explanation (e.g., “Because we want to eat tasty food”), a vitalistic 
explanation (e.g., “Because our stomach takes in vital power from the food”), and a 
mechanical explanation (e.g., “Because we take the food into our body after its form is 
changed in the stomach and bowels”).  Six-year-olds chose the vitalistic explanations 
most often, whereas 8-year-olds and adults chose mechanical explanations most often.  




that children tend to prefer modes of explanation that are appropriately matched with the 
domain of the phenomenon (Wellman & Gelman, 1998).  However, these studies do not 
tell us more generally (across domains) whether children prefer explanations of a 
particular form or level of detail.  
Other research has focused on more domain-general properties of explanations.  
For example, Brewer, Chin, and Samarapungavan (1998) identified five qualities of 
everyday explanations (empirical accuracy, scope, consistency, simplicity, and 
plausibility), and Samarapungavan (1992) tested elementary-school children’s sensitivity 
to some of these metacognitive criteria of explanations within a theory choice task.  
When children were asked to pick the correct mini-theory from two choices (one that 
demonstrated the particular metacognitive trait and one that did not), children as young as 
7 years consistently selected choices that accounted for more observations over ones that 
accounted for fewer observations (range), choices that were consistent with evidence over 
those that were not consistent (empirical consistency), and choices that were internally 
consistent over those that contained contradictions (logical consistency).  Preference for 
mini-theories that are not ad hoc over those that use ad hoc reasoning (i.e., theories that 
possessed extra assumptions that were not testable) was demonstrated by older children 
(11-year-olds) only.   
In addition, recent work by Bonawitz and Lombrozo (2007) investigated 
children’s preferences for simplicity and probability in causal explanations.  In their 
research, like adults (Lombrozo, in press), 6-year-old participants also prefer simpler 
explanations that present a single cause for an event rather than two simultaneous causes 




eating both, rather than two bears each having one).  Results were less clear with regard 
to plausibility. 
Finally, it is important to mention that in addition to research studies using a 
forced-choice methodology, another common methodology has been to examine 
children’s explanations as given in their own words.  In a laboratory-based version of this 
methodology, investigators ask children a causal question about a phenomenon and then 
children’s explanations are recorded, transcribed, and coded for the presence of different 
types of explanations.  An excellent example of this methodology is Au and Romo’s 
(1999) examination of the causal mechanisms present in children’s explanations for 
biological phenomena.  Examination of children’s explanations in their own words has 
also been conducted within naturalistic contexts, as in Hickling and Wellman (2001). 
The current research takes a new approach to examining children’s and adults 
explanatory preferences.  For children, as in Study 2, I created situations where children 
were likely to request explanatory information and then I systematically varied the type 
of answer given by the adult to see if children will react differently to the different types 
of answers they receive (which include, in this study, 3 different types or levels of 
explanation).  This methodology provides information about children’s preferences in 
situations where they are actively seeking explanatory information and initiating the 
conversation (in contrast to the researcher-initiated questioning used in much of the 
previous research).  It is also important to note that all the previous studies looking at 
children’s preferences for different types of explanation focus exclusively on older, 
school-age children.  The methodology used in this research allows for the examination 




More specifically, my aim for Studies 3 and 4 was to contribute to the literature 
concerning explanation preferences by exploring how the amount of detail affects adults’ 
and children’s satisfaction with the explanations they receive.  I created three levels of 
explanation, where a level-1 explanation provides very little detail, but still gives enough 
information to be considered an explanation.  For example, given the question: “Why did 
she pour ketchup on her ice cream?” a level-1 or low-detail explanation might be, “It was 
a mistake.”  Level-2 medium-detail explanations added more detail to the explanation 
such as, “It was a mistake because she thought it was chocolate in the bottle.”  Finally, to 
create the level-3 or high-detail explanations, I added even more detail to the explanation, 
such as, “It was a mistake because she thought it was chocolate in the bottle because the 
ketchup bottle and the chocolate bottle look the same.”  
There are four possible patterns for how participants could react differently to 
these three levels of explanation.  One possibility is that adults and perhaps especially 
children could react as if any explanation is good enough.  In other words, they would be 
satisfied with any explanation (as opposed to a non-explanation), regardless of its level of 
detail.  Another possibility would be that participants may believe that more detail is 
better.  In this case, participants’ satisfaction should increase with the amount of detail 
provided. (Keil’s research might suggest this possibility). A third possibility would be 
that adults and again especially children might prefer the least detailed explanations 
because more detailed explanations are increasingly overwhelming or boring.  In this 
case, their satisfaction should decrease with increasing detail in the explanation.  A final 
possibility, which I favor, is that children and adults may prefer the explanations that 




participants would be less satisfied with the low detail explanations (level-1) because 
they do not provide enough information and less satisfied with the high level detail 







Study 3: Adult Ratings of Explanations and Non-Explanations that Vary in 
Explanatory Detail 
Studies 3 and 4 examined participants’ reactions to the three different levels of 
explanations and non-explanatory answers.  Study 3 allowed us to test my initial 
intuitions with adults to see if, when I provided three different levels of explanatory 
detail, adults would distinguish between them and potentially find one level optimally 
satisfying.  Additionally, Study 3 provided the adult information needed to design Study 
4 with children.  
 In this study, adult participants were presented with pictures that depict 
surprising, unusual, or expectation-violating situations, with descriptive statements below 
the pictures and a target why question asking about the unusual aspect of the situation.  
Participants were asked to rate an answer to the target why question both with regard to 
how satisfying each answer was and whether the answer provided an explanation to the 
question.  As a manipulation check, the participants also rated the relative length of the 
answers.  There were four possible types of answers for each target why question, 
including one non-explanatory answer and three different explanations. 
As outlined earlier, the explanations used in this study varied in the amount and 
type of detail they provided, and in their length in words. The aim was to contrast three 
levels of explanations: a) relatively shallow explanations with the least amount of detail, 




provided the most degree of detail.  The goal for Study 3 was to see if these different 
explanations would yield consistent patterns between the amount of detail provided and 
adults’ ratings of their satisfaction with each answer.  I hypothesized that there would be 
strong distinctions between the ratings of satisfaction for the explanations versus the non-
explanatory answers.  Additionally, I hypothesized that the amount of detail and degree 
of satisfaction might be somewhat independent of one another.  More specifically, I 
expected that for adults’ satisfaction would increase from the level-1 explanations to the 
level-2 explanations, but that the level-3 explanations might not be considerably more 
satisfying than the level-2 explanations because the additional detail in the level-3 
explanations might be considered excessive. 
Beyond providing background information, refined materials, and preliminary 
insights for Study 4, this study also provided a measure of the endpoint for possible 
developmental changes in preferences for different types of explanations.  It is possible 
that children may have a different view of what constitutes a satisfying explanation, 
preferring either a shorter, simpler explanation or (conversely) the maximal amount of 
detail.  Although the measures in the two studies (3 and 4) are different, the combined 
data provided an initial developmental comparison between adults’ ratings (in Study 3 
and children’s reactions (in Study 4) to these different explanations. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample included 64 adults (mean age = 18.73 years old, 30 females, 34 
males).  Participants were recruited using the undergraduate psychology subject pool at a 





Participants were given a packet of pictures depicting 16 unusual, question-
provoking objects or situations.  These were amended/expanded versions of the same 
stimuli used in Study 2.  Short written descriptions were included with each picture or set 
of pictures.  Following each description was a specific why question that targeted the 
unusual aspect of each object/situation depicted.  Following the target question was a 
candidate answer.  These answers were one of four possible answers for each item 
(including three different explanations and one non-explanatory answer).  The three 
explanations differed in terms of how much detail they provided.  The non-explanation 
was included as a contrast to the explanations, similar to the comparison of explanations 
and non-explanations in Study 2. 
For example, participants saw a photo of a hat with a hole cut in it (a picture of 
item 3 in Study 2). Written below this picture was the description, “This hat has a hole in 
it” and the target question, “Why does this have a hole in it?" Below that participants saw 
one of four answers:  
Explanation Level-1: "The owner wanted it that way." (low level of detail; minimal 
explanation)  
Explanation Level-2:  "The owner wanted it that way so her ponytail could fit through the 
hole." (medium level of detail) 
Explanation Level-3:  "The owner wanted it that way so her ponytail could fit through the 
hole, so she cut a hole in it with her scissors." (high level of detail)  
Non-Explanation:  "Hats don’t usually have holes in them."  




were counter-balanced between subjects.  Across their 16 items, participants saw four of 
each type of answer (4 level-1 explanations, 4 level-2 explanations, 4 level-3 
explanations, and 4 non-explanations).  The items and answers and their presentation 
orders were scrambled so that types of answers were mixed across items for different 
subjects and both the items and the type of answer were not presented in any predictable 
order.  For a complete list of explanations and non-explanatory answers used with each 
item, see Appendix D. 
Procedure 
Ratings.  Participants were tested in groups in a quiet room on campus.  They 
went through the packet of stimuli three times to rate each answer on the three different 
scales.  Participants were asked to rate: whether or not the answer provided an 
explanation to the question ("yes" or "no"), their satisfaction with each answer (on a scale 
of 1-6, ranging from "not at all satisfying" to "very satisfying"), and their estimation of 
the length of each answer (on a scale of 1-6, ranging from "short" to "long").  The order 
in which participants rated the answers on these three dimensions was counter-balanced 
between subjects. 
Recall.  I included a recall task following the ratings to examine in a more 
exploratory fashion how well the participants remembered the answers they were 
presented.  Particularly, I was interested in knowing which parts of the explanations they 
found to be the most salient or memorable.  My reasoning was that the explanations 
might be better remembered than the non-explanations. Perhaps, even the level-1 
explanatory information would be better recalled than the non-explanations.  In addition, 




might be the most frequently recalled because they represent an optimal amount of detail. 
To assess recall, after finishing the ratings, participants completed a distraction 
task (a page of multi-digit multiplication problems) lasting approximately 4-5 minutes, in 
order to prevent rehearsal of the explanations provided in the booklets.  Participants were 
then given a packet containing black and white copies of all the picture stimuli (including 
the descriptions and target questions).  Participants were instructed to “Please recall the 
answers that were provided earlier as accurately as possible,” and asked to write down 
what they remembered for each item.  Items within the recall packet were not presented 
in the same order in which participants originally saw the stimuli (the items in the packets 
followed a standard order across participants).   
 Recall coding.  Each response was scored based on the degree to which the 
content of the recalled answer matched the content of the 4 different types of scripted 
answers.  Answers were broken up into segments based on the content added at each 
level of explanation. For example, for the item where there was a puzzle with piece that 
does not fit: 
The level-1 explanation was: “This piece is too tall.” 
The level-2 explanation was: “This piece is too tall because two puzzles got mixed up.” 
The level-3 explanation was: “This piece is too tall because two puzzles got mixed up 
and this piece goes to a different puzzle.” 
Thus, there were 3 segments that were scored as present or absent for any participants’ 
recall for this item and the answer they received: 
The E1 segment: “The piece is too tall” 




The E3 segment: “This piece goes to a different puzzle” 
 Each segment was given a score of either 1 (the information was present) or 0 (the 
information was not present).  The non-explanations (e.g., “All the other pieces fit in this 
puzzle.”) were also scored 1 or 0.  The non-explanations were not broken up into 
segments because they were presented in only one form. 
 To get credit for a segment, the participant did not need to recall the segment 
verbatim, but just needed to get the gist (the underlined portions of the coding scheme, 
see Appendix E).  For some of the segments, there were several ways the participant 
could get credit (symbolized by multiple segments being underlined in the Appendix).  
The coding scheme also included a list of common synonyms that received credit. 
 Inter-rater reliability was established using a randomly selected sample of 20% of 
the data.  Two persons independently coded the reliability sample with 99% agreement 
and a kappa of .98 overall.  Reliability was also calculated for each different segment 
type (E1, E2, E3, and NE); agreement ranged from 95% to 98%, with Kappas ranging 
from .64 to .84.  All of the Kappas for this coding fall within substantial (.61 to .80) 
levels of inter-rater reliability, and 50% fall within near perfect (.81 and above) levels 
(Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Results 
Explanations versus Non-Explanations 
 First, I compared whether participants’ ratings distinguished between the 
explanatory and non-explanatory answers by averaging ratings across the three different 
types of explanations and comparing those averages with participants’ average ratings for 




an explanation, participants said “yes” for explanatory answers 92.5% of the time, 
whereas they said “yes” to non-explanatory answers only 4.1% of the time, t (66) = 
52.04, p < .001.  Participants also rated the explanations as significantly more satisfying 
(M = 3.88 out of 6) than the non-explanatory answers (M = 1.56), t (66) = 16.78, p < 
.001. 
Selection of Non-Explanatory Items 
 I next examined the patterns in participants’ satisfaction ratings across the 3 
different explanation types and non-explanations averaged across all 16 items.  An 
overall ANOVA indicated a significant difference in adults’ ratings of satisfaction, F (3, 
198) = 131.63, p < .001. Bonferroni post-hoc tests yielded two general patterns in the 
data: (a) all three types of explanations (level-1, level-2, and level-3) were more 
satisfying than the non-explanations, all p < .001, (b) ratings of satisfaction increased 
from the level-1 to the level-2 explanations, p < .001, and (c) ratings of satisfaction 
between the level-2 and the level-3 explanations were not significantly different (p > .5).  
When examined individually, the majority of the items (10 out of 16) followed all three 
of these patterns.   
Because this was the modal and predominant pattern for adults, in order to best 
design Study 4, I selected a sub-sample of the most effective items (items that best fit the 
modal patterns for adults) for future use with children.  For the explanatory items, I 
retained the 10 that fit the modal pattern exactly and the 2 others that most closely 
conformed to that pattern. The remaining four items were became the non-explanatory 
items for use with the children (children would all receive a non-explanatory response to 




child data, I report below results for adults that incorporate this decision, focusing on the 
explanatory data for 12 items and non-explanatory data from 4 items. 
 Due to the nature of the counterbalancing of different types of answers with the 
different items, 24 of the adult participants did not receive a non-explanation for one of 
the four target NE items leaving 43 participants for these analyses.  To assure that the 
dropped data (the 24 participants’ ratings of the level-1, level-2, and level-3 explanations 
they received) were not systematically different from the data from the other 43 
participants, I conducted ANOVAs comparing these two groups.  For all three ratings 
(whether the answer was an explanation, satisfaction, or length), there were no significant 
differences between ratings from the two groups.   
 I also confirmed the results comparing explanations (collapsed across levels) with 
non-explanations for these 43 participants.  As in the larger sample, participants in this 
sub-sample were significantly more likely to say that the explanations (collapsed across 
levels) provided an explanatory answer compared to the non-explanations (94.3% versus 
7.8%), t (42) = 21.73, p < .001.  They also rated the explanations as significantly more 
satisfying than the non-explanatory answers (4.00 versus 1.76), t (42) = 8.61, p < .001. 
Identifying Answers as Explanations 
 Table 3 presents the ratings data.  Paralleling the results with all the items and 
participants, an overall ANOVA indicated a significant difference in adults’ identification 
of the four different types of answers (level-1 explanations, level-2 explanations, level-3 
explanations, and non-explanations) as explanations, F (3, 126) = 297.5, p < .001.  
Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that, compared with non-explanations, adults were 




(p < .001), and level-3 explanations (p < .001) were explanations.  Comparing within the 
different types of explanations, participants distinguished both level-2 (p < .001) and 
level-3 explanations (p < .01) from the less-detailed, level-1 explanations (i.e., level-2 
and level-3 explanations were more often rated as explanations), but made no significant 
distinction between the explanatory value of level-2 and level-3 explanatory answers (p = 
1.0).  These two types of explanations were considered equivalent on this scale. 
Satisfaction with the Different Explanations and Non-Explanatory Answers 
 An overall ANOVA indicated a significant difference in adults’ ratings of 
satisfaction with the four different types of answers (level-1 explanations, level-2 
explanations, level-3 explanations, and non-explanations), F (3, 126) = 42.92, p < .001.  
Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that adults were significantly more satisfied with level-
1 explanations (p < .001), level-2 explanations (p < .001), and level-3 explanations (p < 
.001) compared to non-explanations. Further, participants rated level-2 (p < .01) and 
level-3 explanations (p < .05) as more satisfying than the level-1 explanations.  Again, 
there was no significant difference between participants’ ratings of their satisfaction with 
level-2 and level-3 explanations (p = 1.0). 
Ratings of Length 
 An overall ANOVA indicated a significant difference in adults’ ratings of the 
length of the four different types of answers (level-1 explanations, level-2 explanations, 
level-3 explanations, and non-explanations), F (3, 126) = 382.7, p < .001.  Bonferroni 
post-hoc comparisons showed that adult’s ratings of length were significantly different 
for each answer type (p < .001), with level-1 explanations being the shortest, followed by 




longest.  Thus adults were sensitive to differences among all three levels (including level-
2 versus level-3) in terms of their length although they never saw more than one 
explanation at a time. 
Adults’ Recall of the Different Explanations and Non-Explanatory Answers 
 Due to a change in procedure mid-way through data collection, the recall data are 
limited to 49 of the 64 adult participants.  As with the rating data, when I focused 
exclusively on the items I used with children in Study 4, there was a sub-sample of adults 
who were not asked to recall one of the four target NE items.  Therefore I focused on the 
33 participants who received at least one of the four NE items, when comparing non-
explanation recall with recall for the different explanations.  To assure that the dropped 
data (the 16 participants’ recall of the explanatory segments they received) were not 
systematically different from the data from the other 33 participants, I conducted an 
ANOVA comparing these two groups.  There was no significant difference between the 
two groups.   
 Table 4 presents the percentage of the time adults recalled the explanatory 
segments and non-explanations.  The table is organized with the different types or levels 
of explanation in the rows and the segments that make up each level of explanation in the 
first three columns.  As noted previously, the more detailed levels of explanation include 
the explanatory information/segments from the less detailed explanations (e.g., level-3 
explanations include the level-2 and level-1 explanations).   
 To analyze these data, first I examined whether participants recalled explanatory 
information better than non-explanatory information.  I compared participants’ recall of 




(averaging across the E1 and E2 segments, where participants could remember the E1 
segment, the E2 segment or both segments), and high detail explanations (averaging 
across the E1, E2, and E3 segments, where the participant could remember the E1, E2 or 
E3 segment or any combination thereof) with their recall of the non-explanatory answers.  
In Table 4 this corresponds to a comparison between the fourth and fifth columns.  None 
of these paired t-tests were significant. 
 Next, I conducted a series of planned comparisons to examine participants’ recall 
of the different explanatory segments within the 3 types of explanations.  As shown in the 
first and fourth row of Table 4, in general, adult participants were nearly perfect in 
recalling the shorter answers (level-1 explanations and non-explanations), regardless of 
the explanatory content.  However, examining participants’ recall of the different 
explanatory segments within the longer level-2 and level-3 explanations revealed that E2 
segments were recalled significantly better than E1 segments within both level-2 
explanations, t (48) = -4.79, p < .001, and level-3 explanations, t (48) = -4.49, p < .001. 
This can be seen by comparing across the second and third rows in Table 4. (There was 
no significant difference between participants’ recall of E2 and E3 segments within level-
3 explanations.) 
 As previously mentioned, adult participants’ recall of E1 segments was nearly 
perfect when these were the only information provided (in level-1 explanations).  In 
comparison, and as shown in the first column in Table 4, the recall of these segments 
significantly dropped when included in level-2 explanations, t (48) = 5.25, p < .001, and 
when included in level-3 explanations, t (48) = 6.28, p < .001 (comparing recall within 




 Within level-3 explanations (the third row in Table 4), participants’ recall of E1 
segments was also significantly worse than their recall of the E3 segments, t (48) = -3.19, 
p < .01.  This suggests that E1 information was not as salient when competing with the 
presence of E2 detail.  
 Contrary to my prediction, explanations were not recalled more often than non-
explanations. Essentially, adults recalled all the answers they received at very high levels, 
with even the non-explanations recalled 87.4 % of the time. 
Discussion 
In Study 3, results from the ratings show that, for adults, there are meaningful 
distinctions between the length of an explanation and the satisfactory nature of its 
content.  More is not necessarily better.  The level-1 explanations, though short (like the 
non-explanations), were still judged to be explanations the majority of the time and were 
also significantly more satisfying than the non-explanatory answers.  Adding some detail 
made the level-2 explanations more likely to be judged as explanations, more satisfying, 
and in recall more accurately remembered.  However, the additional detail present in the 
level-3 explanations did not significantly increase participants’ satisfaction with these 
explanations.  These results support my initial hypothesis that adults would have a 
preferred level of explanatory detail (level-2), one which includes enough detail to be 
satisfactorily explanative, but not so much detail as to become seemingly redundant, 
trivial, or unnecessary. 
Beyond these substantive findings, Study 2 allowed us to identify a set of items 




these items with children to see how they react.  The adults’ data in Study 3 thus also 







Study 4: Experimental Study of Children’s Satisfaction with Different Levels of 
Explanatory Detail 
  Study 4 combines the methodology from Study 2 (question-provoking stimuli 
with scripted adult responses) with the different levels of explanations used in Study 3.  
My aims were to see if children, within a conversational context, would react differently 
to explanations that vary in their length and level of detail, and to see if children would 
show the same patterns as adults in their recall of the different explanatory segments. 
More specifically, Study 4 followed the same general logic used and validated in 
the prior child studies (Studies 1 and 2), measuring children’s satisfaction with different 
adult answers by examining their conversational responses to these adult answers.  As 
before, I expected that when children are dissatisfied with the answer provided by the 
adult (e.g., when they receive non-explanations), they should be more likely to re-ask 
their original question or to provide their own explanation.  In cases where children are 
satisfied (e.g. when they receive explanations), they should be more likely to agree with 
the answer or to continue the conversation with a new follow-up question. 
Beyond children’s responses to explanations versus non-explanations, my special 
focus here is their responses to the different levels of explanation.  As outlined in Study 
3, I consider four possible patterns for how children could respond differently to these 
different sorts of explanations.  One possibility is that children could react as if any 




explanation (as opposed to a non-explanation), regardless of its level of detail. Although 
this was not true of adults, it remains a distinct possibility for young, preschool children. 
Another possibility would be that children may believe that more detail is better.  In this 
case, children’s satisfaction should increase with the amount of detail provided.  A third 
possibility would be that children might prefer the least detailed explanations because 
more detailed explanations are increasingly overwhelming or boring.  In this case, 
children’s satisfaction should decrease with increasing detail in the explanation.  Again 
this was not true for adults, but could be for children who might at first prefer more 
general, less detailed levels of knowledge (see Wellman & Gelman 1998; Mandler 1988).  
A final possibility would be that children, like adults in Study 3, might prefer the level-2 
explanations, those that provide that provide a medium level of detail.  They would be 
less satisfied with the low detail explanations (level-1) because they do not provide 
enough information and less satisfied with the high level detail explanations (level-3) 
because they provide too much information.  
Although the recall portion of Study 3 was less informative (because adult recall 
was very high for all answers) Study 4 also included a portion that measured children’s 
recall of the different answers they have received.  I reasoned that this measure might be 
more informative with children whose recall would probably be less at ceiling and thus 
more differentiated and potentially more likely to include informative “errors.” So, after 
seeing all of the stimuli with the adult researcher as their conversational partner, the child 
participated in a short distraction task, then the adult asked him or her to recall the 
answers for half of the items (with items chosen to provide a balanced variety of 




measure which parts of the explanations are the most remembered or salient in children’s 
memories.  In addition, children’s recall when they received only a non-explanatory 
answer presented an opportunity to see if children would construct an explanation for the 
items on which they actually did not receive one.  If so, this would be further indication 
of children’s drive for explanation, a drive potentially strong enough to influence the 
child’s memory.  The recall task could therefore potentially work as an assessment of 
constructive memory processes, similar to Signorella and Liben’s (1984) work showing 
that children’s memory was better for schema consistent material and that memory errors 
were most often the result of transforming inconsistent material into schema consistent 
material.     
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-nine 4-year-olds (N = 36; mean age = 54.82 months, SD = 3.57 months; 17 
girls, 19 boys) and 5-year-olds (N = 33; mean age = 63.32 months, SD = 2.93 months; 12 
girls, 21 boys) participated. They were recruited from preschools located in a Midwestern 
university city and a smaller west-coast town, and the setting within the preschools is one 
in which active exploration and questioning are encouraged.  The communities from 
which this sample was recruited are predominantly Caucasian, with mid- to high-level 
SES.   
Materials 
 Materials consisted of the same set of 4 objects, 4 storybooks, 4 pictures, and 4 





 Children were tested individually by an adult interviewer in a quiet room at their 
school.  The interaction was videotaped using a camera in view of the child.  The 
researcher began the session with the same warm-up activity (with “Buggy” the puppet) 
used in Study 2.  Participants were then presented with the objects, storybooks, pictures, 
and short videos.  Each item was presented individually and the items were presented in 
the same order for all children.  The ordering and presentation of the items was the same 
as in Study 2, with one exception.  I began the session with an explanation item (the 
crayons) rather than the puzzle (which in this study was a non-explanation item).   
 As in Study 2, the adult presented each item with a short statement introducing 
the item, without explicitly mentioning the unusual or surprising aspect of the item.  For 
example, “This is my brand new hat,” or “Can you help me put this puzzle together?”   
When the child demonstrated recognition of the unusual aspect of the stimulus (including 
asking a causal why or how question or making a statement about the unusual aspect with 
a quizzical look or intonation), the researcher responded by giving one of the three types 
of explanations or a non-explanatory answer.  For example, the three levels of 
explanation for the video of a girl turning off the lights with her foot were: 
Explanation Level-1: "She didn’t want to use her hands." (low level of detail; minimal 
explanation)  
Explanation Level-2:  "She didn’t want to use her hands because they were sticky." 
(medium level of detail) 
Explanation Level-3:  "She didn’t want to use her hands because they were sticky 
because some jelly squished out of her sandwich." (high level of detail) 




Study 3 (or only slightly amended in a few cases to be more child-friendly), to allow 
adult-child comparison.  The three different levels of explanation were varied across 12 
of the 16 items using a repeated sequence that varied across children (e.g., level-3, then 
level-1, then level-2; or level-1, then level-3, then level-2; etc.) with the goal that children 
received an equal number of each type.  For the other four items, the adult provided a 
non-explanation.  The same four items were always non-explanations across all the 
children and were spaced evenly across the items presented (i.e., the fourth item, the 
eighth item, the twelfth item, and the sixteenth item).  The non-explanatory answers 
included restatements (e.g., “All the other pieces fit in this puzzle”); normative 
descriptions (e.g., “People don’t usually jump on hats”); or descriptive details (e.g., “That 
bed is very comfortable”).  
After giving the response, the adult paused to allow time for the child’s reaction 
before moving on to the next item.  In cases where the researcher had responded with a 
non-explanation and the child re-asked his or her original question (or continued to 
demonstrate curiosity about the unusual aspect of the item), the researcher avoided 
providing any additional information and answered the child by saying, “That’s a good 
question. Would you like to see the next thing I brought?” This was done to avoid 
contaminating children’s recall of the scripted responses at the end of the study.   
 In preparation for the recall task at the end of the procedure, the adult researcher 
made sure that the child heard at least two types of each response (2 low-detail 
explanations, 2 medium-detail explanations, 2 high-detail explanations, and 2 non-
explanations).  This required that the child inquire about at least half of the sixteen items.  




prompted the child to notice and verbalize an acknowledgement of the unusual aspect of 
the stimulus by asking the child questions like, “Is there anything funny about this?” or 
“Is there anything you want to ask about this?”  The conversation between the child and 
researcher was videotaped and transcribed.   
Coding 
The children’s responses were coded into one of ten categories, using the same 
coding system as was used in Study 2. The four key categories again were: 
a) Agreeing with the adult, including nodding head or saying “oh,” 
For example: CHILD: “She turning off the lights with, with her foot,”  
ADULT (level-2 explanation): “She didn’t want to use her hands because they 
were sticky,” CHILD: “Oh.” 
b) Asking a follow-up question, 
For example: CHILD: “Does this open?” ADULT (level-1 explanation): “It’s  
       stuck,” CHILD: “How’d it get stuck?” 
c) Re-asking the original question, and 
For example: CHILD: “Why’s his bed outside?” ADULT (non-explanation): 
“That bed is very comfortable,” CHILD: “But why is it outside?” 
d) Providing own explanation. 
 For example: CHILD: “Why’d she do that?” ADULT (non-explanation): 
 “People don’t usually jump on hats,” CHILD: “Maybe she didn’t like that 
 hat.” 
Additional categories were also included to provide additional information about the 




provides additional on-topic details, h) changes topic or asks for next item, and i) no 
response.  The coding categories are detailed in Appendix F.  Whether the child had used 
a question or a requestive statement to acknowledge the unusual aspect of the stimulus 
was also coded.  
Overall across all 9 child response coding categories, there was 86% agreement, 
with a Kappa of .80.  Reliability was also calculated for each child response coding 
category; percent agreement ranged from 93% to 99%, with Kappas ranging from .60 to 
.87.  Because instances of children providing their own explanations were rare, reliability 
for this category was calculated using a separate 20% sample resulting in 99% agreement 
and a Kappa of .72.  All of the Kappas for coding in this study fall within substantial (.61 
to .80) levels of inter-rater reliability, and 33% fall within near perfect (.81 and above) 
levels (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Recall 
As in Study 3, I also included a recall task at the end of the procedure to measure 
how much of the answers the participants accurately remembered.  After finishing with 
the 16 stimuli, the researcher engaged the child in a 4-minute distraction task which 
involved the child looking for objects hidden in pictures (none overlapping with the test 
items).  The researcher then asked the child about eight of the test items, using a small 
color picture of each item and a short statement to remind the child of the unusual aspect 
of the item (e.g., “Remember these crayons were all red.”). Then the researcher asked the 
child to recall the answer she had given for that item, (e.g., “Do you remember what I 
said about why they were all red?”).  The eight items the researcher asked the child about 




tried to include items for which the child had asked a question initially, as opposed to 
those items where the child had used a statement to request an explanation or where the 
researcher had to point out the unusual aspect of the stimulus.   
My predictions for the children were the same as those I had for the adult in 
advance of Study 3.  In general, I predicted that children would remember the 
explanations better than the non-explanations.  Again, I predicted that even the low-detail 
level-1 explanations would be better recalled than the non-explanations.  For the level-2 
and level-3 explanations, my prediction was that children, like the adults in Study 4, 
would recall the E2 segments more frequently than the other explanatory segments.  As 
mentioned in the introduction for this study, I was also interested to see whether child 
participants would alter the non-explanatory answers they were given to be explanatory.  
Recall coding.  The children’s recalled answers were videotaped and transcribed.  
As was done with the adults’ answers in Study 3, the children’s answers were coded for 
the presence/absence of different segments of the answers provided by the researcher.  
The same coding scheme was used across both Study 3 and Study 4 (see Appendix E), 
with the same guidelines and standards being applied to both adult and child answers. 
 Inter-rater reliability for the child recall coding was established using randomly 
selected samples of 20% of the data.  Two persons independently coded the reliability 
sample and if a satisfactory level of agreement was not achieved, disagreements were 
discussed and an additional 20% sample was selected for reliability coding.  Overall, the 
inter-rater reliability reached 95% agreement, with a kappa of .80.  Reliability was also 
calculated for each different segment type (E1, E2, E3 and NE); agreement ranged from 




fall within substantial (.61 to .80) levels of inter-rater reliability, and 75% fall within near 
perfect (.81 and above) levels (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Results 
Children were each presented with all 16 stimuli in individual sessions lasting 15-
20 minutes.  Children asked an average of 3.88 questions and made requestive statements 
about the unusual aspect of the stimulus an average of 11.75 times for a total of 15.63 
“requests” for explanation.  The adult researcher provided the child with an average of 
3.94 level-1 explanations, 3.87 level-2 explanations, 3.93 level-3 explanations, and 3.90 
non-explanations in response to the child’s requests about the unusual stimuli, thus 
providing the four different answers each about 25% of the time. 
Do Children Respond Differently to Explanations versus Non-Explanatory Answers? 
As in Studies 1 and 2, if the purpose of children’s causal questions is to actively 
seek explanatory knowledge, one would expect to find variation in the pattern of 
children’s responses based on whether or not they have received a causal explanation.  I 
first aimed to replicate their responses to explanations versus non-explanations in this 
study.  Specifically, as in Studies 1 and 2, I predicted that children would be more likely 
to agree and ask follow-up questions following explanations, whereas re-asking the 
original question and providing their own explanation were predicted to be more frequent 
following non-explanatory answers.   
To analyze these data, I calculated proportions for each child by dividing the 
frequency of each type of child reaction following an explanation by the number of 
explanations that that child received.  The same was done for child reactions following 




by the child.  An overall ANOVA indicated a significant difference in the patterns of 
child responses following explanations versus following non-explanations, F (8, 544) = 
14.06, p < .001.  Confirming the same patterns as were shown in Study 1 and in Study 2, 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons showed that children were significantly more likely to 
agree, p < .05, or ask a follow-up question, p < .001, in response to explanations than to 
non-explanatory answers.  Conversely, children were significantly more likely to respond 
by re-asking their question, p < .001, or by providing their own explanation, p < .01, 
following non-explanations compared to explanations.   
As in Study 2, these patterns in children’s responses were consistent across a 
majority of children in Study 4.  Of the 47 children who responded at least once by 
agreeing or nodding their heads, 32 did so more often following an explanation than 
following a non-explanation, p < .05, binomial test.  For follow-up questions, of the 41 
children who asked at least one of these questions, 37 children did this more often in 
response to an explanation than in response to a non-explanation, p < .001, binomial test.  
Of the children who responded at least once by re-asking their original question, 31 out of 
33 did so more often when they received a non-explanation as opposed to an explanation, 
p < .001, binomial test.  Finally, 13 out of the 16 children who provided their own 
explanation at least once used this response more often following non-explanations than 
explanations, p < .05, binomial test. 
Children’s Use of Questions versus Statements to Request Explanations 
As in Study 2, I confirmed that children’s requestive statements functioned 
similarly to their questions regarding the surprising elements of the test items. This was 




frequent and their requestive statements were more frequent. To parallel the analyses in 
Study 2, I looked at children’s reactions to explanations (collapsed across the level-1, -2, 
and -3 explanations within this study) versus their reactions to non-explanatory answers 
following these two types of initial responses.   
 As in Study 2, the pattern of children’s reactions to explanations differed as 
predicted in comparison to their reactions to non-explanations (within the four key 
categories) both for questions and for requestive statements considered separately.  When 
children asked a question initially and when they used a statement initially, they were 
more likely to agree/nod their heads, and to ask a follow-up question when they received 
an explanation than when they received a non-explanation (all p < .05).  When children 
received a non-explanation in response to their question or requestive statement, they 
were more likely to re-ask their question, in contrast to when they received an 
explanation (both ps < .001).  The only difference between instances when children asked 
a question initially and when they used a statement to acknowledge the unusual aspect of 
the stimulus was in the “provides own explanation” category, which showed a significant 
difference only for the instances when children used requestive statements (p < .01).  
However, in the cases where children asked a question initially, providing their own 
explanations did go in the predicted direction of more frequently following non-
explanations than explanations.   
Did Children Respond Differently to Explanations that Vary in their Amount of Detail? 
 I calculated proportions for each child by dividing the frequency of each type of 
child reaction following level-1 explanations by the number of level-1 explanations that 




and non-explanations.  The data are presented in Table 5.  An overall ANOVA indicated 
a significant difference in the patterns of child responses following these four types of 
adult responses, F (24, 1608) = 7.43, p < .001.   
 Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons confirmed my hypothesis that the level-2 
explanations would be the most satisfying. Children were significantly more likely to 
agree with level-2 explanations (p < .05) and with level-3 explanations (p < .05) 
compared to level-1 explanations.  In addition, children were significantly more likely to 
agree with level-2 explanations compared to non-explanations, p < .05.   
 In line with the results from Study 1 and Study 2, children were significantly 
more likely to ask a follow-up question in response to level-1 explanations (p < .001), 
level-2 explanations (p < .01), and level-3 explanations (p < .01), compared to non-
explanations.  In contrast, children were significantly more likely to re-ask their original 
question following a non-explanation than following a level-1 explanation (p < .001), a 
level-2 explanation (p < .001), or a level-3 explanation (p < .001).  Finally, when 
providing their own explanations, children were significantly more likely to do this in 
response to a non-explanation than in response to a level-2 explanation (p < .01) or a 
level-3 explanation (p < .01). 
 Results for the other coding categories are reported in the bottom portion of Table 
5.  When children responded by smiling or laughing it was significantly more likely to be 
in response to a level-2 explanation or a level-3 explanation than in response to a level-1 
explanation or a non-explanation (all p < .05).  Matching results from Study 2, children 
were significantly more likely to disagree with non-explanations, than with level-1 




Are there Developmental Differences in Children’s Patterns of Reactions? 
In the prior analyses, there were no significant main effects or interactions 
involving age.  But to confirm that results hold for the younger children (the 4-year-olds), 
separate analyses for this age group confirmed that they demonstrated the same pattern of 
reactions following the four different types of adult responses.  Specifically, just as in the 
entire data, the 4-year-old children were more likely to agree with level-2 explanations 
compared to level-1 explanations, p < .05.  These younger children were also 
significantly more likely to ask a follow-up question in response to level-1 explanations 
(p < .05), level-2 explanations (p < .05), and level-3 explanations (p < .05), compared to 
non-explanations.  These 4-year-olds were also significantly more likely to re-ask their 
original question following a non-explanation than following a level-1 explanation (p < 
.01), a level-2 explanation (p < .01), or a level-3 explanation (p < .01).   
Children’s Recall of the Different Explanations and Non-Explanatory Answers 
 Table 6 presents the percentage of the time children recalled the explanatory 
segments and non-explanations.  The table is organized with the different types or levels 
of explanation in the rows and the segments that make up each level of explanation in the 
first three columns.   
 To analyze these data, first I compared whether the child participants recalled 
explanatory information better than non-explanatory information.  As in Study 3, I 
compared participants’ recall of the low detail explanations (containing only the E1 
segment), medium detail explanations (averaging across the E1 and E2 segments, where 
participants could remember the E1 segment, the E2 segment or both segments), and high 




could remember the E1, E2 or E3 segment or any combination thereof) with their recall 
of the non-explanatory answers.  In Table 6 this corresponds to a comparison between the 
fourth and fifth columns.  All three of these paired t-tests were significant, with low-
detail explanations, t (68) = 9.46, p < .001, medium-detail explanations, t (68) = 6.49, p < 
.001, and high-detail explanations, t (68) = 4.74, p < .001, being recalled more accurately 
than non-explanations. 
 Next, I conducted a series of planned comparisons to examine participants’ recall 
of the different explanatory segments within the explanations.  As predicted, in the level-
2 and level-3 explanations, the recall of E2 segments was better than any other detail 
provided.  Participants’ recall of E2 segments was significantly better than their recall of 
E1 segments within both level-2 explanations, t (48) = -7.79, p < .001, and level-3 
explanations, t (48) = -5.61, p < .001 (see the second and third rows of Table 6).  Within 
level-3 explanations, participants’ recall of E2 segments was also significantly better than 
their recall of E3 segments, t (48) = 3.66, p < .01.  Importantly, these results show that 
children’s tendency to recall the E2 segments so well in the level-2 explanations is not 
just because the E2 segment was the last part they heard.  Even when the E2 segments are 
in the middle of the level-3 explanations, they are still the most frequently recalled.  
 Showing patterns similar to the adults, child participants recalled E1 segments 
best (67.8% of the time) when these were the only information provided (in level-1 
explanations).  In comparison, as shown in the first column of Table 6, the recall of these 
segments significantly dropped to 29% when included in level-2 explanations, t (68) = 
7.68, p < .001, and to 27.1% when included in level-3 explanations, t (68) = 7.30, p < 




 When comparing participants’ recall of explanatory segments with their recall of 
the non-explanations, my predictions were generally confirmed with the children.  
Children remembered the E1 segments of low-detail (level-1) explanations, t (68) = 9.46, 
p < .001, the E2 segments from medium-detail (level-2) explanations, t (68) = 8.80, p < 
.001, the E2 segments from high-detail (level-3) explanations, t (68) = 6.71, p < .001, and 
the E3 segments of the high detail (level 3) explanations, t (68) = 2.63, p < .05, all 
significantly better than the non-explanatory answers. 
Altering the Non-Explanations to be Explanatory  
 I was interested to see whether child participants would alter the non-explanatory 
answers they were given to make them more explanatory.  On 40.3% of trials children 
misremembered the non-explanation as if it were an explanation (by adding “because” 
7.2% of the time and/or by coming up with an actual explanatory account 33.1% of the 
time).  These “explanatory intrusions” illustrate the constructive nature of their recall:  
children seemed to expect to receive an explanation, and when they did not, they mis-
recalled the experimenter’s response as if it were explanatory. 
Discussion 
 When considering explanations versus non-explanations, the results from this 
study confirm the results from Study 2.  Even the short, less-detailed level-1 explanations 
were recognized by children to be explanations.  In comparison to non-explanations, 
these level-1 explanations were better remembered and inspired significantly more 
follow-up questions, and children reacted significantly less often by re-asking their 
original question.  Note that these results also provide strong evidence against the 




explanations are actually shorter on average (M = 4.25 words) than the non-explanations 
(M = 6.25 words).  Level-2 and level-3 explanations also demonstrate these same patterns 
in comparison to non-explanations.  
When comparing between the different levels of explanation, results from this 
study suggest that children, like adults, find the medium level of detail (level-2) 
explanations to be the most satisfying.  These level-2 explanations, in particular, receive 
high levels of agreement and smiling/laughing when compared with level-1 explanations.  
When extra detail beyond this level was added in the level-3 explanations, this did not 
change children’s pattern of reactions, providing additional support for the idea that 
children are reacting to the content, rather than the length of the explanation provided. 
 In the recall task, children also distinguished between the explanatory and non-
explanatory information provided by the adult researcher.  Children’s recall of the non-
explanatory information was significantly less frequent than their recall of any of the 
explanations.  This was a result I did not see in Study 3 because adults’ recall of non-
explanations was very high and much more frequent than children’s recall of this content.  
Aside from developmental differences in working memory, these differences can also be 
attributed to the differences between the two tasks.  Adults saw each answer three times 
while completing the ratings portion of the study, whereas children heard the answers 
only once in a conversational context.  In addition, adults may have been more willing to 
write down the non-explanation as an answer to a causal why-question than they would 
have been to state a non-explanation in response to the same why-question voiced aloud 




 The instances when children inaccurately recalled the non-explanations as 
explanatory lend additional support to the idea that children are specifically motivated to 
seek explanations.  These “explanatory intrusions” provided an interesting example of 
constructive childhood memory.  Children apparently expected to receive an explanation, 
and when they did not, they frequently misremembered the adult’s response as if it were 
explanatory.  It is important to note that there were also instances of children, when 
prompted to recall what the researcher had said about why the puzzle piece did not fit or 
the bed was outside, etc., responding by accurately saying that the researcher had not told 
them this information. 
 With regard to their recall of the individual explanatory segments, children 
generally showed the expected patterns (also generally shown by adults), with the detail 
provided in E2 segments in the level-2 and level-3 explanations being the most 
memorable.  That this information was still the most frequently recalled even when it was 
in the middle of the level-3 explanations (where there was no primacy or recency effects), 
suggests that there is something special about this segment.  Is it because the E2 segment 
is an optimal length, with the E3 details being forgotten because they are excessive and 
unnecessary?  Or perhaps is there something special about the content of these segments?  








 Across the studies presented in this paper, I have provided evidence to support the 
hypothesis that preschool-aged children actively seek explanatory information within 
conversations with adults.  By examining children’s reactions to an adult’s provision of 
explanations versus non-explanatory answers in response to their inquiries, in both 
naturalistic (Study 1) and experimental (Studies 2 and 4) contexts, children demonstrate 
evidence of satisfaction when they receive explanations, and continued inquiry when they 
receive non-explanatory answers.  In addition, results from Studies 3 and 4 suggest that 
both adults and children prefer and have a better memory for explanations that are neither 
under- nor overly-detailed, but instead contain a mid-level of detail.   
 These findings are important for several reasons.  First, as was mentioned in the 
discussion of the first two studies, I have identified a methodology for assessing 
children’s explanatory preferences within a conversational context representative of 
experiences they have in their everyday lives.  Children have numerous opportunities to 
engage adults in conversation, and I have demonstrated how these conversations in fact 
provide a means for children to actively acquire explanatory information.  In addition, 
this research has demonstrated that examining conversational exchanges and pushing 
beyond questions and answers to specifically look at the third step in conversation 




inquiry, but also how children evaluate the content of the answer they receive.  This 
methodology has promising potential for use in future research. 
  Additionally, the finding that both adults and children have similar preferences for 
explanations containing a mid-level of detail not only challenges the notion that more 
detail is always better in explanations, but also challenges the idea that adults and 
children are satisfied with minimally detailed or “shallow” explanations.  It appears that 
there is an optimal level of “explanatory depth” for explanations, demonstrated across 
Studies 3 and 4 using multiple means of assessment including adults’ ratings of 
satisfaction, children’s conversational reactions and both adults’ and children’s recall.  
Both adults and preschool-aged children followed similar patterns in their recall, with the 
E2 segments being the most frequently recalled even when this information was in the 
middle of the level-3 explanations, counteracting both primacy and recency effects. 
  However, within this research, it is still an open question as to what it is exactly 
about the level-2 explanations, and specifically the E2 segments, that makes them the 
most satisfying.  Is it that they are merely an optimal length (neither too short nor too 
long)?  The results from the studies presented here argue against length as the primary 
factor in participants’ satisfaction.  The non-explanations from Studies 3 and 4 are not 
more satisfying, despite being longer than the level-1 explanations.  Additionally, 
children’s patterns of responses are the same following level-2 explanations and longer 
level-3 explanations.  Finally, looking at the ratings for individual items, there was no 
systematic trend between adults’ satisfaction ratings and the relative length of the 




range for level-2 explanations) were not systematically more satisfying than the shorter 
level-1 explanations.   
 Another possible hypothesis, which is the one favored here, is that there 
something special about the nature of the information provided in the E2 segments.  The 
challenge is how best to characterize the content of these segments and explain what 
intuitively seems to make them qualitatively different from the E1 and E3 segments.  The 
E1 segments, while they do function as explanations when presented alone in level-1 
explanations, only provide details that situate the explanation within a domain.  For 
example, “I wanted it that way” and “She didn’t mean to” signal psychological causes, 
whereas “It’s stuck” and “Regular doors are too big for Julia” signal physical causes.  
However, in order to best understand the situation, these E1 segments seem to prompt a 
further question of why “it’s stuck” or why “I wanted it that way.”  The E2 segments 
answer these questions, by providing information about the underlying “purpose,” 
“rationale,” or “cause” (I put these terms in quotes because it is difficult to find an 
overarching term to best characterize the nature of this information).  In other words, the 
E2 segments seem to really get to the heart of the matter, in a way that is both 
appropriately specific and yet also still generalizable to other similar situations, past 
experiences, or prior knowledge. 
 Anecdotal evidence from Study 4 supports this idea that the details provided in 
the E2 segments fit especially well within children’s prior knowledge.  One example of 
this is that for the storybook item with the boy who puts orange juice on his cereal, 




“he’s allergic” suggesting that they had fit the information provided by the adult into an 
explanatory knowledge they already possessed about food allergies.   
 The question remains then of how best to describe the nature of the E3 segments. 
I believe the notion of generalizability may be related to the nature of the E3 segments.  
For most of the items, it seems as if the additional details provided in the E3 segments are 
ones that could be inferred easily (perhaps from one’s own past experiences or 
knowledge) once the E2 information is known.   
 It is important to mention two other factors that also might be contributing to why 
the E2 segments were particularly satisfying and memorable.  As mentioned previously, 
these studies did not control for the domain in which each explanatory segment was 
situated and instead used a variety of psychological, physical and biological explanatory 
segments across the different items.  Additionally, there was also variation in what the 
building explanatory segments (the E2 and E3 segments) contributed to the explanations.  
In some cases, these segments created a “causal chain” in which the additional segment 
provided new explanatory information (as if answering an additional “why” question); 
whereas in other cases, these segments only added detail to the previous segment, without 
any new explanatory information.  For example, the E3 segment for the girl who pours 
ketchup on her ice cream (“because the ketchup bottle and the chocolate bottle look the 
same”) provides new explanatory information regarding why she thought there was 
ketchup in the bottle, whereas the E3 segment for the girl who goes to bed with her 
clothes on (“into her pajamas”) merely provides additional detail.  Exploring how these 
factors contribute to adults’ and children’s satisfaction and memory of different 




 There are other limitations to this research that should be acknowledged.  First, 
while the results did show significant differences in the way children reacted to different 
types of adult answers, it should be noted that, particularly in Study 4, instances when the 
children did not provide a reaction were relatively frequent.  The increased frequency of 
these “no response” instances in Study 4 compared to Study 2 is likely due to two factors: 
the children’s familiarity with the researcher and the pace at which the researcher moved 
through the items.  Study 2 was primarily conducted in the university preschool setting 
where the researcher had spent at least two hours (across multiple visits) building rapport 
with the children prior to the study.  In contrast, Study 4 was primarily conducted in 
preschools were the researcher visited for a single day and had only minimal contact with 
the children prior to their participation in the study.  It is likely that children feel more 
comfortable and react more frequently in conversations with adults they are more familiar 
with compared to those they have only recently met.  In addition, in Study 4, because of 
the added time needed for the distraction and recall tasks, it was necessary that the 
researcher move through the items at a faster pace than had previously been used in 
Study 2.  Perhaps if given more time to react, children in Study 4 may have provided 
more responses. 
 Another potential limitation of this research concerns an additional possible 
source of information children might use to identify and distinguish explanations from 
non-explanations.  The researchers in Studies 2 and 4 aimed to use the same amount of 
enthusiasm across both explanatory and non-explanatory answers.  However, it is 
possible that in conversational contexts, adults’ responses may contain intonational cues 




non-explanatory information.  The videotaped data from Study 2 and 4 in this project 
could be used to check for differences in intonation, but an even more interesting 
possibility would be to examine the intonational cues present in naturalistic adult-child 
explanatory conversation.  In the same way that child-directed speech (or “motherese”) 
may aid children’s language development, perhaps there is an “explanationese” that 
signals the importance of explanatory information.   
 A final limitation of this research concerns the demographics of the preschool 
children included in the samples for Study 2 and Study 4.  These children were recruited 
from predominantly Caucasian, mid to high-income communities, where the cultural 
context is one that supports and encourages children to directly inquire for information 
from the adults around them.  The results from these studies may not extend to other 
cultural contexts where the expectations and norms for interacting with adults may be 
different for children.  Rather than initiating causal inquiry through conversation, 
children may have different strategies for obtaining explanatory knowledge in these 
contexts. 
 Several questions remain for future research.  First, what is the developmental 
course of these patterns?  I have explored preschool-aged children’s questions and their 
reactions to the answers they receive, but it would be interesting to know when these 
patterns first emerge.  The earliest data in these studies is from the transcripts of 2-year-
olds in Study 1 as they are voicing their first causal questions.  Do children request 
explanatory information prior to their ability to verbalize causal questions?  In 
Chouinard’s (2007) study, she provides some insight into this question.  Using a dairy 




recorded instances where they appeared to be requesting information using gestures, 
expressions and vocalizations.  Chouinard (2007) reports that while requests for 
explanatory information at this age were rare (only 3% of the time with the rest of the 
requests being for fact-based information), they did exist.  It would be interesting to know 
if, at this young age, children would persist in requesting explanatory information if they 
did not first receive it.   
 It is also an open question as to how children’s reactions and explanatory 
preferences might change after the age of 5.  In Study 1, across the ages of 2 to 4 years 
old, the frequency of adults’ provision of explanations decreased, while at the same time, 
the frequency of children providing their own explanations increased.  I believe that this 
might be evidence of a developmental change in the nature of these adult-child 
explanatory conversations.  As the children get older, they are better able to verbalize and 
figure out on their own possible explanations for the questionable phenomena around 
them.  With children’s increasing capabilities, adults’ role may shift from providing 
immediate explanations in response to children’s inquiries to instead providing 
supporting details that encourage children to come up with explanatory possibilities 
themselves.   
 With regard to children’s preferences for a particular level of explanatory detail, 
results from Studies 3 and 4 suggest that there may be little developmental change 
between the ages tested here and adulthood.  It was especially interesting to see that 
adults and 4- and 5-year-olds showed such similar patterns across the different levels of 
explanatory detail (both in measures of satisfaction and in recall).  Preferences for the 




how these preferences emerge is a fascinating question for future research.   One avenue 
for exploration with regard to this question might be examining the level of detail present 
in parents’ explanations.  This approach would be similar one taken by Kelemen, 
Callanan, Casler and Perez-Granados (2005) who coded parents’ explanatory modes in an 
effort to investigate one possible origin (parental modeling) of children’s tendency to 
produce a teleological explanations.  However, parents’ explanations did not demonstrate 
the same teleological bias as children’s and were instead primarily causal and only rarely 
teleological.  With regard to the amount of explanatory detail, how much parental 
modeling affects the explanations children prefer and produce remains an open question. 
 There is also the question of whether the patterns in child reactions following 
explanations and non-explanations might change based on the child’s conversational 
partner.  Does the child’s sense of their conversational speaker’s expertise play a role in 
how they respond to the information they receive?  Are adults, such as parents, teachers, 
and researchers, seen as more knowledgeable (and therefore more credible) by the child 
compared to fellow peers, students, or siblings?  And if so, does this affect how children 
treat explanatory responses, and which do they find most satisfying?  I would expect that 
the expertise of the conversational partner would play the greatest role in situations where 
the explanation provided conflicts with the child’s intuitions or past knowledge.  In these 
cases, children would probably be more likely to agree with the explanations of 
individuals they see as expert and more likely to disagree or reject the explanations of 
those they see as less knowledgeable (or direct their question elsewhere).  It would be 




whose explanations vary in their accuracy or amount of detail and then see which person 
the child chooses to address his/her questions toward. 
 Finally, there is the issue of whether there are domain differences in the sorts of 
explanations children find most satisfying.  In Study 3 and 4, the different levels of 
explanations often combined explanatory information from more than one domain.  For 
instance, “It was a mistake because she thought it was chocolate in the bottle because the 
ketchup and the chocolate bottle look the same” combines information across 
psychological and physical domains, and the explanation, “He wanted orange juice 
because milk makes him sick” combines across both psychological and biological 
domains.  Are these sorts of explanations that span across several domains potentially 
more satisfying that those that provide detail within a single domain?  Perhaps providing 
information from multiple domains would allow children to make explanatory 
connections across domains, or if children have a specific domain in mind when they 
make an inquiry, perhaps multiple domain answers might just have a better chance of 
covering that target domain.  Would children react with indications of dissatisfaction or 
have poor recall for explanations that are not within the domain they had in mind?  These 
are open questions for future research that could be explored using methodology similar 
to Study 4, using explanations that span across multiple domains versus explanations that 
provide detail within a single domain.  The challenge for a study like this would be 
determining domain for which the child is requesting information. 
 Children’s building of explanatory knowledge is without doubt a complicated and 





exchanges, this research has provided a glimpse into how this one part of this process 




Table 1. Study 1: Percentage of Child Reactions Following Adult Explanations versus Non-Explanatory Responses (N = 6)  
 
 Adult Response  
 
 






Agrees or says “oh” 11.6 % 6.3 % ** 
 
Asks a follow-up question 18.5 % 4.6 % ** 
 
Re-asks original question 9.4 % 24.0 % ** 
 









Disagrees with adult response 3.4 % 1.6 % ** 
 















* p < .01, ** p < .001 
 






Table 2. Study 2: Percentage of Child Reactions Following Adult Explanations versus Non-Explanatory Responses (N = 42) 
 
 Adult Response  
 
 




Agrees, nods head, or says “oh” 29.5 % 12.6 % ** 
 
Asks a follow-up question 21.4 % 6.6 % ** 
 
Re-asks original question 1.2 % 21.4 % ** 
 









Smiles or laughs 7.0 % 0.9 % ** 
 




5.8 % ** 
 













19.8 % 22.0 % n.s. 
 


























( NE ) 
 
Does this answer provide an 
explanation to the question? 
 
(percentage of the time the 
participants answered “yes”) 
 
84.7 % a 98.8 % b 99.4 % b 7.8 % c 
 
How satisfying is this answer? 
 






4.23 b 1.76 c 
 
How long is this answer? 
 
(rated on a 1-6 scale; actual length 















Significant differences are indicated by contrasting superscripts. 
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Table 4. Study 3: Percentage of the Time Adults Recalled Each Answer Segment (N = 49 
for comparisons between explanation segments, N = 33 for comparisons between 








( E1 ) 
Segment a 
 
( E2 ) 
Segment b 
 





(N = 33) 
 






( level-1 ) 





( level-2 ) 




( level-3 ) 




( NE ) 
 
- - - - 87.4 
 
Significant differences between recall of the explanatory segments and recall of the non-
explanation are indicated by stars: * p < .05. 
 
Pair-wise comparisons: 
a. E1 segment: recall in level-1 is significantly different from recall in level-2, p < .001; 
recall in level-1 is significantly different from recall in level-3, p < .001 
b. E2 segment: recall in level-2 is significantly different from recall in level-3, p < .05 
c. Level-2 explanation: recall of E1 is significantly different from recall of E2, p < .001 
d. Level-3 explanation: recall of E1 is significantly different from recall of E2, p < .001; 




Table 5. Study 4: Percentage of Child Reactions Following Adult Explanations versus Non-Explanatory Responses (N = 69) 
 
 Adult Response 
Child Reaction 
Low Detail  
Explanation 
( level-1 ) 
Medium Detail 
Explanation 
( level-2 ) 
High Detail 
Explanation 
( level-3 ) 
Non-Explanatory 
Response 
( NE ) 
 
Agrees, nods head, or says “oh” 10.9 a  19.9 b,* 18.2 b 10.2 
 
Asks a follow-up question 16.9 * 11.6 * 12.3 * 2.9 
 
Re-asks original question 1.9 * 1.1 * 0.3 * 18.0 
 











Smiles or laughs 4.1 a 11.8 b,* 16.2 b,* 2.2 
 




0.3 * 0 * 4.0 
 





11.2 10.4 14.4 
 














Significant differences between the three different explanation types are indicated by contrasting superscripts, p < .05. 
Significant differences between an explanation type and the non-explanatory responses are indicated by stars, p < .05. 93
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Table 6. Study 4: Percentage of the Time Children Recalled Each Answer Segment  
(N = 69) 
 
  
( E1 ) 
Segment a 
 
( E2 ) 
Segment b 
 












( level-1 ) 




( level-2 ) 




( level-3 ) 




( NE ) 
 
- - - - 18.8 
Significant differences between recall of the explanatory segments and recall of the non-
explanation are indicated by stars: * p < .05 
 
Pair-wise comparisons: 
a. E1 segment: recall in level-1 is significantly different from recall in level-2,  
 p < .001; recall in level-1 is significantly different from recall in level-3, p < .001 
b. E2 segment: recall in level-2 is significantly different from recall in level-3, p < .01 
c. Level-2 explanation: recall of E1 is significantly different from recall of E2, p < .001 
d. Level-3 explanation: recall of E1 is significantly different from recall of E2, p < .001; 




Coding Categories Used in Study 1 
Form of Child’s Question  
1. fully-formed, including an articulated topic (“Why is the sky blue?”)  
2. single-word or not including topic (“Why?” “How come?” “Why not?”) 
Examples of questions that were not included (close imposters of causal questions): 
“How’s that?” “How was it big?” “How would you like to go find bones from that 
guy?” “How does that sound?” “I know why dey so tiny.” “Did you show Ursula 
how to do it?” “See how dark it is?” “How ya like that?” 
 
Adult Response Categories 
a) Explanation 
Examples: 
CHILD: Why you making tacos? ADULT: I thought you'd like them. 
CHILD: Why you put some water in there, Mom? ADULT: To help mix all of the 
ingredients together. 
CHILD: Why I have red hands? ADULT: Because pomegranate juice is red, 
right? 
CHILD: Why the mailman got this to me? ADULT: Because he likes you. 
CHILD: Why dose lobsters? ADULT: Because that's what they were born to be. 
b) Non-Explanatory Answer (includes:  providing new or focusing information, 
redefining or correcting assumptions underlying the child’s question, 
confirming/agreeing with the child’s question, asking a clarification question, redirecting 
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the question to someone else, saying “I don’t know,” “Because” or “Because I said so,” 
or not responding. 
Examples: 
CHILD: Why some are white?  ADULT: That's not white; that's brown, isn't it? 
CHILD: Why some are brown, some are yellow? ADULT: You were right at first. 
CHILD: “How can snakes hear if they don't have ears?” ADULT: “I don't think 
they can hear.” 
CHILD: “How you erase the red off?” ADULT: “It's harder than the black to 
erase.” 
CHILD: “Why clowns put some powder on the face?”  ADULT: “Why do ya 
think?” 
ADULT: “Don’t touch it now.” CHILD: “Why?” ADULT: “Because!” 
CHILD: “Why?” ADULT: “Because that’s one of those questions I just can’t 
answer, honey.” 
CHILD: “How do you make your voice go on?” ADULT: “I’ll show you in a 
minute.” 
CHILD: “Why does he push this?” ADULT: “He’s just pushing it.” 
CHILD: “Why did they send those toys back to America?” ADULT: “Which 
toys, honey?” 
CHILD: “Why are all the cars stopped over there?” ADULT: “Do you really think 






1. Mechanism: Procedure-like explanations in which a step or series of steps were 
mentioned as a way of explaining how something works.   
Example: CHILD: Why it can’t turn off? ADULT: Because the springs are all 
wound up. 
2. Prior Causal Event: Explanations that provide a single event that occurred prior to and 
caused the asked-about event.   
Example: CHILD: Why my tummy so big, Mom? ADULT: Because you ate a lot. 
3. Consequence: Explanations that provide a purpose for, or an event or state that will 
occur later in time than, the asked-about event or state. Includes teleological 
explanations, which assume that objects, behaviors or events occur or exist for a purpose 
(Kelemen, 1999).   
Example: CHILD: Why does Andy go to the barber? ADULT: To get his hair cut. 
4. Current State of World, Non-Mechanism: Explanations that refer to the existence of an 
object/entity or the state/quality of a situation that is the cause of the asked-about 
phenomenon; does not mention a specific mechanism. 
Example: CHILD: Why not keep a light on? ADULT: Because we have the sun.   
5. Other 
 
Child Response Categories 
a) Agrees with adult 




b) Asks a Follow-Up Question 
Includes: asking a question that is on the same general topic as the original 
question, but requests different information than was requested in the original 
question 
Example: CHILD: Why they going deep-sea diving? ADULT: (no response) 
CHILD: How are the people going down dere? 
c) Re-asks Original Question 
Includes: repeating or rephrasing the original question; requests the same 
information as the original question  
Example: CHILD: How are the people going down dere? ADULT: (no response) 
CHILD: How dey going to get there? 
d) Provides his/her Own Explanation  
Includes: offering an alternative explanation to the one the adult has provided or 
providing an explanation when the adult has not given one 
Example: CHILD: How come the airplanes wanted to shoot the mean monster?  
ADULT: They thought the monster would come to their city and eat it.  CHILD: 
No, the monster crashed the planes down like this. 
Example: CHILD: Do you know why he's going to live next to the mine?  
ADULT: How come?  CHILD: Because he likes it next to the mine. 
e) Disagrees with adult 
f) Provides Additional On-Topic Supporting Details 
Example: CHILD: Why did you give me the blue one? ADULT: (no response) 




g) Changes topic 
h) No response 





Explanations and Non-Explanatory Answers Given in Response to Child Inquiries in Study 2 
 
Question Stimuli: Objects Explanation Non-Explanation 
 
1. Animal puzzle 
 
Why doesn’t this piece fit? 
 
 
I think the pieces from two 
puzzles got mixed up. 
 
 
I think all the other pieces fit in 
this puzzle. 
2. Red crayons Why are all of these red? 
 
I’ll bet it’s because the factory 
messed up. 
 
You’re right, they are all red. 
3. Hat with hole Why does this have a hole 
in it? 
 
It’s to put a ponytail through. Hats don’t usually have holes 
in them. 
4. Cell phone glued shut Why doesn’t this open? Oh, I think it was broken and 
somebody accidentally glued it 
shut. 
 
It looks like it has some 
buttons on the outside. 
Stimuli: Storybooks Question Explanation Non-Explanation 
 
1. Ice cream and ketchup 
 
 
Why did she do that? 
 




That looks like vanilla ice 
cream. 
2. Clothes in bed Why did she do that? She was so tired that she fell 
asleep before putting her 
pajamas on. 
 
I like to sleep under lots of 
covers when I go to bed. 
3. Cereal and orange juice Why did he do that? He thought it was milk in the 
pitcher. 
 






4. Playing outside with 
scarf 
 
Why did he do that? He wanted to play a joke on 
his friend. 
Yeah, he’s wearing a scarf 
when it’s hot outside. 
Stimuli: Pictures Question Explanation Non-Explanation 
 
1. Nest with turtle 
 
Why is the turtle in that 
nest? 
 
You know, I think the turtle 
crawled in there by mistake. 
 
 
You’re right, there is a turtle in 
that bird’s nest. 
2. Little door 
 
Why is that door so small? 
 
You know, I’m pretty sure it’s 
a fairy door. 
 
I think doors are usually much 
bigger than that. 
3. Clown nose Why is he wearing a red 
nose? 
 
He works as a clown and 
forgot to take it off. 
People don’t usually wear red 
noses like that. 
4. Bed outside Why is Tommy’s bed 
outside? 
 
Tommy’s parents are painting 
his room. 
I think that bed looks 
comfortable. 
Stimuli: Videos Question Explanation Non-Explanation 
 
1. Light switch with foot 
 
Why did Brandy do that? 
 
Brandy didn’t want to touch 




I like the color of the shirt that 
Brandy’s is wearing. 
2. Spin in hallway Why is Brandy doing that? 
 
I’m pretty sure Brandy’s 
practicing a dance move. 
 
I like how Brandy is spinning 
in the hallway. 
3. Bucket as hat Why did you do that? I’m pretending the blue bucket 
is a hat. 
 
I didn’t put the hat on my 
head. 
4. Hat stomp There was a bug in my hat. People don’t usually jump on 
hats. 




Coding Categories Used For Child Responses in Study 2 
 
a) Agrees, nods head or says “oh” 
Example: ADULT: I think the pieces from two puzzles got mixed up.   
CHILD: Me too. 
b) Asks a follow-up question, including clarification questions 
Example: ADULT: Brandy didn’t want to touch the light switch with her sticky 
hands. CHILD: Why her hands were sticky? 
Example: ADULT: I’m pretty sure that’s a fairy door. CHILD: What’s a fairy 
door? 
Example: ADULT: Tommy’s parents are painting his room. CHILD: So they put 
it outside? 
c) Re-asks original question 
Example: CHILD (original question): Why did he? ADULT: I like to put milk on 
my cereal. CHILD: Why did he pour orange juice in his cereal? 
d) Provides own explanation 
Example: ADULT: I’ll bet it’s because the factory messed up. CHILD: Well, 
maybe  because someone took them out and put a lot of reds in there. Maybe a 
leprechaun did that. 
e) Smiles or Laughs 
f) Disagrees with adult response 
 Example: ADULT: I like to put milk on my cereal. CHILD: Not me. 
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Example: ADULT: People don’t usually wear red noses like that. CHILD: Some 
do. Deers have red noses. 
g) Provides additional on-topic supporting details 
Example: ADULT: You know, I think the turtle crawled in there by mistake. 
CHILD: I think that bird’s trying to eat the turtle. 
Example: ADULT: You’re right, there is a turtle in that bird’s nest. CHILD: I like 
turtles. 
h) Changes the topic or asks for next item 
Example: ADULT: I’m pretending the blue bucket is a hat. CHILD: You have a 
different shirt on.  
 Example: CHILD: Now let’s see another story. 





Answers Used in Study 3 and Study 4: Three Types of Explanations and the Non-
Explanations 
 
E1: Explanation with low level of detail 
E2: Explanation with medium level of detail 
E3: Explanation with high level of detail 
NE: Non-explanatory answer 
 
Box of crayons that are all one color 
E1: It was a mistake. 
E2: It was a mistake in packaging at the crayon factory. 
E3: It was a mistake in packaging at the crayon factory and the machine put all the same 
color crayons into one box. 
NE: They are all the same color. 
Hat with a hole in it 
E1: The owner wanted it that way. 
E2: The owner wanted it that way so her ponytail could fit through the hole. 
E3: The owner wanted it that way so her ponytail could fit through the hole, so she cut a 
hole in it with her scissors. 
NE: Hats don’t usually have holes in them. 
Phone that will not open 
E1: It’s stuck. 
E2: It’s stuck because somebody spilled glue on it. 
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E3: It’s stuck because somebody spilled glue on it and the glue ran into the crack and 
pasted it together. 
NE: It looks like a young girl’s cell phone. 
Puzzle with piece that does not fit * 
E1: This piece is too tall. 
E2: This piece is too tall because two puzzles got mixed up. 
E3: This piece is too tall because two puzzles got mixed up and this piece goes to a 
different puzzle. 
NE: All the other pieces fit in this puzzle. 
* Children always received always the non-explanation for this item  
Girl who puts ketchup on her ice cream 
E1: It was a mistake. 
E2: It was a mistake because she thought it was chocolate in the bottle. 
E3: It was a mistake because she thought it was chocolate in the bottle because the 
ketchup bottle and the chocolate bottle look the same. 
NE: That looks like vanilla ice cream. 
Girl who goes to sleep with her clothes and shoes on 
E1: She didn’t mean to. 
E2: She didn’t mean to, but she was really tired so she fell asleep without changing. 
E3: She didn’t mean to, but she was really tired so she fell asleep without changing into 
her pajamas. 
NE: Some people sleep under lots of covers when they go to bed. 
Boy who puts orange juice on his cereal 
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E1: He wanted orange juice. 
E2: He wanted orange juice because milk makes him sick. 
E3: He wanted orange juice because milk makes him sick, so he has to have his cereal 
with juice instead. 
NE: Most people put milk on their cereal. 
Boy who wears hat, scarf and gloves in hot weather * 
E1: He wanted to. 
E2: He wanted to play a joke on his friend. 
E3: He wanted to play a joke on his friend so he put on all his winter clothes even though 
it was hot outside. 
NE: He’s wearing all his winter clothes. 
* Children always received always the non-explanation for this item  
Turtle in a bird’s nest 
E1: He crawled in there. 
E2: He crawled in there because he was looking for something to eat. 
E3: He crawled in there because he was looking for something to eat and he couldn’t see 
what was in the nest. 
NE: He is in a bird’s nest. 
Miniature door 
E1: Regular doors are too big for Julia. 
E2: Regular doors are too big for Julia because she’s a mouse. 
E3: Regular doors are too big for Julia because she’s a mouse and she can’t reach the 
doorknob on a big door. 
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NE: Doors are usually much bigger than that. 
Man wearing a red nose 
E1: He works as a clown. 
E2: He works as a clown and he forgot to take it off. 
E3: He works as a clown and he forgot to take it off because he didn’t look in the mirror. 
NE: People don’t usually wear red noses like that. 
Bed outside the house * 
E1: Tommy’s parents moved it outside. 
E2: Tommy’s parents moved it outside because they are painting his room. 
E3: Tommy’s parents moved it outside because they are painting his room and they 
didn’t want to get paint on it. 
NE: That bed is very comfortable. 
* Children always received always the non-explanation for this item  
Girl turns off light switch with her foot 
E1: She didn’t want to use her hands. 
E2: She didn’t want to use her hands because they were sticky. 
E3: She didn’t want to use her hands because they were sticky because some jelly 
squished out of her sandwich. 
NE: She’s wearing a pretty blue shirt. 
Girl spins while walking down a hallway 
E1: She’s practicing. 




E3: She’s practicing so she will be ready for her dance class because when she practices, 
she gets better. 
NE: She looks like she’s going fast. 
Girl puts a bucket on her head instead of a hat  
E1: She’s pretending. 
E2: She’s pretending the blue bucket was a fairy crown. 
E3: She’s pretending the blue bucket was a fairy crown so she could be a beautiful fairy 
princess. 
NE: She didn’t put the hat on her head. 
Girl takes off her hat and jumps on it * 
E1: She’s trying to squish it. 
E2: She’s trying to squish it because she felt a bug in it. 
E3: She’s trying to squish it because she felt a bug in it and she doesn’t like bugs. 
NE: People don’t usually jump on hats. 




Appendix E: Coding Scheme for Study 3 and Study 4 Recalled Answers 
 
It was a mistake 
Also: didn’t mean to, goof, error, 
shouldn’t, accident, got mixed up 
in packaging at the crayon factory1. crayons  
 
the machine put all the same color 
crayons into one box 
Must include mention of machine OR all 
the same color ending up in one container 
2. hat 
 
I wanted it that way 
Also: need 
so my ponytail could fit through the 
hole 
Give credit for “for your ponytail” 
so I cut a hole in it with my 
scissors 
Also: ripped it, anything about how I put the 
hole there 
3. phone It’s stuck because somebody spilled glue on it 
Also: it was glued 
the glue ran into the crack and 
pasted it together 
Must include something about where the 
glue went OR information about how it was 
stuck together; “in it” alone is not enough. 
4. puzzle NE: All the other pieces fit in this puzzle. 
It was a mistake 
Also: didn’t mean to, goof, error, 
shouldn’t, accident, didn’t know 
because she thought it was chocolate 
in the bottle 
Also: didn’t know 
because the ketchup bottle and the 
chocolate bottle look the same
5. ketchup 
 
She didn’t mean to 
Also: mistake, goof, error, 
shouldn’t, forgot, didn’t want to 
but she was really tired so she fell 
asleep without changing 
Any of the three parts is enough for credit. 
Also: didn’t change 







He wanted orange juice 7. orange juice 
Also: need 
because milk makes him sick 
Also: doesn’t taste good, doesn’t like milk, 
allergic, tummy ache 
so he has to have his cereal with 
juice instead 
 
8. winter clothes NE: He’s wearing all his winter clothes.           Don’t give credit for “He thought it was winter.” 
He crawled in there 9. turtle/nest 
Also: crawled up, climbed in, went 
in 
because he was looking for something 
to eat 
Also: hungry, wanted to eat, food 
he couldn’t see what was in the 
nest 
Also: didn’t know what was in there 
10. door Regular doors are too big 
for Julia 
Should include mention of Julia’s 
size, incl. “she’s little” 
because she’s a mouse 
Also: rat 
she can’t reach the doorknob on a 
big door 
11. nose He works as a clown he forgot to take it off 
Also: left it on, still on, didn’t take off 
because he didn’t look in the 
mirror 
 
12. bed NE: That bed is very comfortable. 
She didn’t want to use her 
hands 
Also: didn’t feel like using her 
hands 
because they were sticky because some jelly squished out of 
her sandwich 
Should include the cause of the sticky 
hands, any food is fine. 










14. spin She’s practicing 
Also: training, getting ready 
so she will be ready for her dance 
class 
Also: to be a dancer, dance moves, for dance, 
dance routine, for a dance, ballet, recital 
because when she practices, she 
gets better 
 
15. bucket She’s pretending 
Also: thinking, wanted, trying, to 
act as 
the blue bucket was a fairy crown 
Also: bucket as a hat 
so she could be a beautiful fairy 
princess 
Give E3 credit for  “to be a fairy,” but not 
for “she’s wearing a fairy crown”  





Coding Categories Used for Child Responses in Study 4 
 
a) Agrees, nods head or says “oh” 
Example: ADULT: He wanted orange juice because milk makes him sick.  
CHILD: Oh. 
 Example: ADULT: I wanted it that way so my ponytail could fit through the hole.  
 CHILD: Oh. 
Example: ADULT: People don’t usually jump on hats. CHILD: I never jumped 
on my  hat.  
b) Asks a follow-up question, including clarification questions 
Example: ADULT: It’s stuck because somebody spilled glue on it.  CHILD: Why 
did somebody spill glue on it?  
Example: ADULT: He wanted orange juice because milk makes him sick.  
CHILD: Why  does it make him sick?  
Example: ADULT: It’s stuck because somebody spilled glue on it and the glue 
ran into the crack and pasted it together.  CHILD: So, we’ll never be able to play 
with it?  
Example: ADULT: He crawled in there because he was looking for something to 
eat.  CHILD: What did he want to eat?  
Example: ADULT: She’s practicing so she’ll be ready for her dance class.  
CHILD: Grownups take dance class? 
c) Re-asks original question 
 
113  
Example: CHILD (original question): Then why’s his bed outside?  ADULT: 
That bed is very comfortable.  CHILD: Yeah, but why is it outside then?  
Example: CHILD (original question): Why is she stomping on your hat?  
ADULT: People don’t usually jump on hats.  ADULT: But why is she?  
Example: CHILD (original question): Why is she turning all the lights out?  
ADULT: She  didn’t want to use her hands because they were sticky.  CHILD: 
Then why’d she turn all the lights out?  
d) Provides own explanation 
Example: ADULT: Yeah, he wanted orange juice.  CHILD: He thought it was 
milk. 
 Example: ADULT: He wanted orange juice.  CHILD: He made a mistake.  
Example: ADULT: She didn’t want to use her hands because they were sticky 
because some jelly squished out of her sandwich.  CHILD: And she had her hands 
full.   
 Example: ADULT: She didn’t mean to.  CHILD: Forgot to put her pajamas on.  
Example: ADULT: All the other pieces fit in that puzzle.  CHILD: It goes in 
another puzzle, I know.  
Example: ADULT: He’s wearing all his winter clothes.  CHILD: And that, and 
that’s a mistake.  
Example: ADULT: People don’t usually jump on hats.  CHILD: Unless they’re 
bad hats.  
e) Smiles or Laughs 
f) Disagrees with adult response 
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Example: ADULT: That bed is very comfortable.  CHILD: I don’t think it’s very 
warm.  
Example: ADULT: That bed is very comfortable.  CHILD: Well, it doesn’t look 
so comfortable.  
 Example: ADULT: That bed is very comfortable. CHILD: It is not.  
g) Provides additional on-topic supporting details 
Example: ADULT: Yeah, she didn’t want to use her hands because they were 
sticky because some jelly squished out of her sandwich.  CHILD: Jelly is really 
sticky. 
 Example: ADULT: He crawled in there.  CHILD: Silly turtle.  
Example: ADULT: She didn’t mean to but she was really tired so she fell asleep 
without changing into her pajamas.  CHILD: She must have stayed up too late. 
h) Changes the topic or asks for next item  
Example: ADULT: Regular doors are too big for Julia because she is a mouse.  
CHILD: Why did she have a sock for a mat? 
Example: ADULT: It was a mistake in packaging at the crayon factory and the 
machine put all the same color crayons into one box. CHILD: I’m not really good 
at moons.  
Example: ADULT: He works as a clown and he forgot to take it off.  CHILD: Ah, 
hair’s on my tongue!  
Example: ADULT: She didn’t want to use her hands.  CHILD: Now, what’s the 





Example: ADULT: She didn’t want to use her hands.  CHILD: What’s the next 
one?  
Example: ADULT: She didn’t mean to but she was really tired so she fell asleep 




Au, T.K., & Romo L.F. (1999). Mechanical causality in children’s “folkbiology.” In D.L. 
Medin & S. Atran (Eds.) Folkbiology (pp. 355-401). Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press.  
Bakeman, R., & Gottman, J. M. (1997). Observing interaction (2nd ed.). New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Bloom, L., Merkin, S. & Wootten, J. (1982). Wh-questions: Linguistic factors that 
contribute to the sequence of acquisition. Child Development, 53, 1084-1092. 
Bonawitz, E. B. & Lombrozo, T. (2007, July). Simplicity and probability in children’s 
causal explanations. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Cognitive Science 
Society. Memphis, TN.  
Brewer, W.F., Chinn, C.A. & Samarapungavan, A. (1998) Explanation in scientists and 
children. Minds and Machines, 8, 119-136. 
Brown, R. (1968). The development of wh questions in child speech. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Behavior, 7, 279-290. 
Brown, R. (1973). A first language: The early stages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Bullock, M., & Gelman, R. (1979). Preschool children’s assumptions about cause and 
effect: Temporal ordering. Child Development, 50, 89-96. 
Cairns, H. S., & Hsu, J. R. (1978). Who, why, when and how: a development study. 
Journal of Child Language, 5, 477-488. 
 
117  
Callanan, M.A., & Oakes, L.M. (1992). Preschoolers’ questions and parents’ 
explanations: Causal thinking in everyday activity. Cognitive Development, 7, 213-
233. 
Callanan, M.A., Perez-Granados, D., Barajas, N. & Goldberg, J. (1999). “Why” questions 
in Mexican-descent children’s conversations with parents. Manuscript under review. 
Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chouinard, M. M. (2007). Children's questions: A mechanism for cognitive development. 
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 72 (1, Serial No. 
286). 
Gopnik, A. (1998). Explanation as orgasm. Minds and Machines, 8, 101-118.  
Gopnik, A., & Schulz, L. (2004). Mechanisms of theory formation in young children. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 371-377. 
Harris, P. L., & Koenig, M. (2006). Trust in testimony: How children learn about science 
and religion. Child Development, 77, 505-524. 
Hatano, G., & Inagaki, K. (1993). Young children’s understanding of the mind-body 
distinction. Child Development, 64(5), 1534-1549. 
Hickling A.K., & Wellman, H.M. (2001). The emergence of children’s causal 
explanations and theories: Evidence from everyday conversation. Developmental 
Psychology, 37 (5), 668-683. 
Hood, L., & Bloom, L. (1979). What, when, and how about why: A longitudinal study of 
early expressions of causality. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child 
Development, 44 (6, Serial No. 181). 
 
118  
Isaacs, N. (1930). Children’s “why” questions. In S. Isaacs (Ed.), Intellectual growth in 
young children (pp. 291-349). London: George Routledge & Sons. 
Keil, F. C. (1998). Words, moms, and things: Language as a road map to reality. 
Commentary for Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 63 
(1, Serial No. 253). 
Kelemen, D. (1999). The scope of teleological thinking in preschool children. Cognition, 
70, 241-272. 
Kelemen, D., Callanan, M. A., Casler, K., & Pérez-Granados, D. R. (2005). Why things 
happen: Teleological explanations in parent-child conversations. Developmental 
Psychology, 41, 251-264. 
Kemler Nelson, D. G., Egan, L. C., & Holt, M. B. (2004). When children ask, “What is 
it?” What do they want to know about artifacts? Psychological Science, 15, 384-389. 
Klima, E. S., & Bellugi, U. (1966). Syntactic regularities in the speech of children. In J. 
Lyons & R. J. Wales (Eds.), Psycholinguistics papers. Edinburgh, Scotland: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Kuczaj, S.A. (1976). –ing, –s, and –ed: A study of the acquisition of certain verb 
inflections (Doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1977). Dissertation 
Abstracts International, 37, 5400-5401. 
Lagattuta, K. H., & Wellman, H. M. (2002). Differences in early parent-child 
conversations about negative versus positive emotions: Implications for the 




Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for 
categorical data. Biometrics, 33, 159-174. 
Lombrozo, T. (in press). Simplicity and probability in causal explanation, Cognitive 
Psychology. 
MacWhinney, B. (1995). The CHILDES Project: Tools for analyzing talk (2nd ed.). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
MacWhinney, B., & Snow, C. (1985). The child language data exchange system. Journal 
of Child Language, 12, 271-296. 
MacWhinney, B., & Snow, C. (1990). The child language data exchange system: An 
update. Journal of Child Language, 17, 457-472. 
Mandler, J. M. (1988). How to build a baby: On the development of an accessible 
representational system. Cognitive Development, 3, 113-136 
Mills, C. M., & Keil, F. C. (2004). Knowing the limits of one’s understanding: The 
development of an awareness of an illusion of explanatory depth. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 87, 1-32. 
Murphy, G. L. & Medin, D. L. (1985). The role of theories in conceptual coherence. 
Psychological Review, 92, 284-316. 
Piaget, J. (1930). The child’s conception of physical causality. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic Books. 
Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. C. (2002). The misunderstood limits of folk science: An illusion 
of explanatory depth. Cognitive Science, 26, 521-562. 





in parent–child discourse. In K. E. Nelson (Ed.), Children’s language, Vol. 4, 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Samarapungavan, A. (1992). Children’s judgments in theory choice tasks: Scientific 
rationality in childhood. Cognition, 45, 1-32. 
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shultz, T. R., & Mendelson, R. (1975). The use of covariation as a principle of causal 
analysis. Child Development, 46, 394-399. 
Signorella, M. L., & Liben, L. S. (1984). Recall and reconstruction of gender-related 
pictures: Effects of attitude, task difficulty, and age. Child Development, 55, 393-405. 
Simon, H. A. (2001) “Seek and ye shall find” How curiosity engenders discovery. 
 Designing for Science. pp 5-20. 
Simons, D. J., & Keil, F. C. (1995). An abstract to concrete shift in the development of 
biological thought: The insides story. Cognition, 56, 129-163. 
Sobel, D. M., & Kirkham, N. Z. (2006). Blickets and babies: The development of causal 
reasoning in toddlers and infants. Developmental Psychology, 42, 1103-1115. 
Tyack, D., & Ingram, D. Children’s production and comprehension of questions. Journal 
of Child Language, 4, 211-224.  
Wellman, H., & Gelman, S. A. (1998). Knowledge acquisition in foundational domains. 
In W. Damon & D. Kuhn & R. Siegler (Eds.), Cognition, perception and language 
(5th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 523-573). New York: Wiley. 
Werner, H., & Kaplan, B. (1963). Symbol formation. New York: Wiley. 
 
